主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年） -- 徐荣

卡宾枪

鸡肋

在低于冰点的寒冷季节里，卡宾枪就不好使了。根据气温的不同，在实现正常的全自动射击前，无论你身处何处，都要对卡宾枪进行5至20次不等的试射预热。

因为卡宾枪被制造成了全自动的，所以它就很敏感。在大热天，哪怕是很少的一点灰尘和潮气混在一起就能使它哑火；而在严寒下，他比其他任何武器都更容易被冻住，也更难以被润滑到可以正常使用的程度。

弹仓是另一个麻烦不断的地方。只几周时间，弹夹边缘的子弹就被氧化和灰尘沾染的锈迹斑斑。痕迹非常明显。那些灰尘大的都能用指甲挖掉。当子弹进入弹膛，那些在子弹表面由于腐蚀而产生的金属污垢就会积留在弹膛内。就这样，它会逐渐的越积越多，最终形成一个大块污物，随后卡宾枪的部件就会（由于那个大块污物的存在）失灵。为了防止这样的失灵，除了频繁的退出和清洗弹仓内的子弹，别无他法。但这种方法所需的时间是耗不起的。

这种武器不够威猛。太骄气。他的日常使用随着季节变化，时好时坏。当射击调到半自动档的时候，还可靠些，如果时全自动档，简直是浪费弹药。在半自动射击时，它的精度还不足以对付一个中等距离上的目标。以上批评来自于朝鲜战争中使用过卡宾枪的部队。

“鸡肋”的名声比在二战包括太平洋战场中更加响亮。在太平洋战场，卡宾枪近乎无所作为。海军陆战队的批评比陆军更凶。陆战一师从上到下对这东西都没有好印象。他们在朝鲜战争中使用卡宾枪的经验就是完全失望。他们要求，要么彻底淘汰卡宾枪，要么就对卡宾枪进行改进，使之成为有可靠性的武器。第八集团军的绝大多数人对卡宾枪也是同样感觉。不过，偶尔也会有某连或某排对卡宾枪并无太强烈的感受，这种反映取决于该部队是否在战斗关键时刻使用了一定数量的卡宾枪，并同时遭受了惨痛的经历。通常部队中，配备卡宾枪的人属于少数，因此，在一场恶仗之后，某连并没有过多受卡宾枪连累而造成的伤亡，那也是有可能的。这也就使得人们的那种对卡宾枪几乎是一致的强烈反感完全变得更加出人意料。

不单单是步兵有这种反感，就是那些经历过几次在炮兵阵地上与渗透过来的敌军步兵近距离交战的炮兵连，他们也会以尽可能快的速度（撂下卡宾枪）拿起M1步枪。人们对卡宾枪进行判断和选择时所怀着的那种对卡宾枪的宿怨，可以用一个事例加以说明。1950年11月26日晚到27日凌晨，第27步兵团E连作为第25步兵师主力正面突出部一点，与敌军进行了殊死的战斗。虽然该连在人数上远远少于中国人，但是该连的作战是如此勇猛，以至于该连能一直坚守着他们的阵地，黎明来临之时，敌军完成了最后的进攻就撤退了。随后该连奉命撤到一个朝向南面的新阵地。敌军进攻的压力减缓。死者和伤者被从高地上移走。在进行战斗总结的过程中，当将士们做出解释和说明时，除卡宾枪以外的所有武器都被提及，并被给予了肯定。尽管在高地上，卡宾枪被扔的到处都是，可并没有人愿意把它们捡起来使用。我们发现，在战斗过程中，卡宾枪并没有遭到咒骂；因此我们猜想，那是由于卡宾枪没有给将士们帮倒忙。

由于这些卡宾枪的火力有助于敌人行动，所以没有多少声音要求一定要使用他们。在记录中的阵地战斗，也有几百件孤立事件涉及使用卡宾枪毙伤一个敌人的情况。这些非常有限的例子里，使用者都是在非常短的距离内用全自动档扫倒1，2个甚至4个敌人的。不过，卡宾枪能够通过近距离密集的火力削弱敌人的进攻意志的说法，还没有被敌方的反应情况所证实。没有清晰的案例支持这点，即由于卡宾枪密集的火力迫使敌人放弃进攻撤退的情况。这已经把夜晚战斗有限的观察条件和高度紧张的氛围考虑在内了。

此外，中国军队执着与夜间进攻也是部分问题所在。按道理来说，卡宾枪也能够在战斗初期提供教强火力。但只有少量弹药能够达到敌人的进攻出发地。如果不计射速慢的M1，这些火力不足以组织敌人接近到手榴弹距离。而当士兵们面对敌人冲到足够近的缓坡时，能够够到敌人的手榴弹之类的投掷武器似乎更能够保护自己。在平坦的平地上，情况会有所不同，不过，朝鲜更多的是复杂的山地。在高地战斗中，卡宾枪的火力不足以阻止敌人接近，而当敌人最后进攻时，卡宾枪又形同虚设。

在白天的战斗中。武器又要求另外的使用途经。需要的是半自动火力，火力洛点特别分散。事实证明，又没有多少目标能够让卡宾枪充分发挥自动火力的特点。

射程和杀伤力

没有充分数据支持卡宾枪的射程超过50码。记录中有极少数卡宾枪在这个距离或更远的地方撂倒敌人的情况。不过这个数量太少，不能够视为一般结论。卡宾枪的杀伤效果大约有95％发生在50码以内。因为在朝鲜的战术行动中，白刃战十分频繁，所以在如此短的距离内选择使用卡宾枪应该是一个不错的选择。

杀伤效果差也是一个重要的抱怨理由。一些战斗总结中，大约50次行动记录中，有7名目击者声称他们毫无疑问打中了敌人身体，可那些被击中的敌人士兵仍然可以继续冲锋。一个目击者是陆战1团的约瑟夫 R 费舍尔中尉。陆战一师认为他是一个杰出的连级指挥官。他在描述下碣隅里战斗时，有如下呈词。“大约有30％的卡宾枪给我们造成了麻烦，一些不能开火，一些冻住了。但是我们的人对卡宾枪丧失信心的最主要原因是当我们把子弹打进25码远的中国佬的胸膛后，他还能继续前进。这使我十分震惊。这些子弹打得很深。敌人还能继续行动。我们有半打人有同样的抱怨。有些人发誓他们至少打中3，4次，都不能使被击中者停下来。”

THECARBINE

ANVIL CHORUS

In subfreezing weather, the carbine operates sluggishly and, depending upon the degree of cold, will require anywhere from 5 to 20 warm-up shots before it will fire full automatic.

Since being made full automatic, it is hypersensitive. In hot weather, even small amounts of dust and moisture together will cause it to misfire. In cold weather, it is more sensitive to frost than any other weapon, and more difficult to lubricate in such a way that it will remain operative.

The magazines are a source of continuing trouble. After only a few weeks the clipped ammunition begins to corrode at the edges where it rubs the metal of the clip, and as the oxidization proceeds dirt becomes mixed with it. The discoloration is obvious, and the dirt can be scraped off with the fingernail. When the shell is injected, the fouled metal leaves its accumulation on the chamber. As this builds up, it gradually develops a block, and the piece goes out of action. There is no way to prevent such stoppages except by frequent unclipping and cleaning of the ammunition; time is insufficient for that.

The weapon lacks “power.” It is “too delicate.” Its day-to-day operation is (too variable,” according to changes in the weather. It was “more dependable” when it was semi-automatic. When fired full automatic, it “wastes ammunition.” When fired semi-automatic it isn’t sufficiently accurate for “aimed fire at moderate distances.”

. . . These are a few of the criticisms voiced by troops who have used the carbine in Korean operations. The anvil chorus is much louder than during World War II operations, including the Pacific, where the carbine was hardly an outstanding success.

The Marine criticism is even more harsh than that of the Army. From top to bottom, 1st Marine Division takes the dim view of this weapon; their experience with it during the Chosen Reservoir operation was the final blow to confidence. They want it either eliminated or made over into a dependable weapon. The clear majority of Eighth

Army infantry feels this same way about it. An occasional platoon or company can be found which does not feel particularly harshly about the carbine; the reaction ofthe average unit depends upon whether it has had a particularly costly experience with a number of carbines in a critical moment; since usually the carbine men are in the minority, it is possible for a company to go through a stiff fight without undue injury from carbine failures. That makes the almost unanimously strong feeling against the weapon all the more surprising. Not alone does the infantry feel this way; the artillery batteries, which have had several experiences with close-in defense of the gun positions against infiltration, are also going over to the Ml as rapidly as they can convert.

The rancor which attends this judgment of the weapon can be attested by one incident. On the night of 26-27 November 1950, Easy Company, 27th Infantry Regiment, fought a desperate action when serving as the point, well to the fore of the main body of the 25th Infantry Division. They were vastly outnumbered by the Chinese, but they held their ground with such valor that the enemy, after a last full-scale charge, drew back just as dawn came. The company was then ordered by higher command to fall back on new ground to the southward. The pressure had eased. Dead and wounded were removed from the hill. Also, as the men explained in the course of the critique, all weapons were brought out “except the carbines. They were scattered around the hill, but no one felt like picking them up. We had found during the fight that they were no damned good and we figured they wouldn’t help the enemy.”

As to the possible effect of full automatic fire by the carbine upon enemy action, there are no sound criteria for attempting an evaluation. In the perimeter fights which are covered by the record, there are literally hundreds of incidents in which the individual relates how with aimed fire from the carbine he shot one of the enemy. There are other instances, limited in number, in which the firer, using the weapon automatically, brought down two, three, or four of the enemy in one burst delivered at exceptionally close range. But what the weapon accomplishes to discourage the enemy and deter his aggressiveness by putting out a considerable volume of fire in a short space, is not provable by the data on enemy reaction. There were no clean-cut examples establishing that, because of a high rate of fire from the carbines in a particular sector, the enemy became discouraged and drew back.

The conditions of limited observation and high nerve tension which attend nighttime engagement are generally exclusive of any such possible findings.

However, the persistence of the Chinese after-dark attack has a partial bearing on the question. The carbines produce their heaviest volume of fire in the earlier stages of the fight. They begin to run low on ammunition before there is any marked flagging in the strength of the enemy attack. Their fire does not prevent the enemy from closing to within grenade range of the defended ground, nor for that matter does the slower fire of the Ml. When men are pinned fairly close to earth by an enemy down slope at close range, the grenade thrown from the high ground has a good chance of finding its mark, whereas because of instinctive reaction to the desire for self-preservation, fire delivered from a shoulder weapon will likely go high. On flat ground, the tendencies would be different. But, there is relatively little fighting on an even grade in Korea.

In the hill fights, carbine volume does not prevent the enemy from closing, and when

his final rushes are made, the carbines are beginning to go empty. In the daylight attack, the weapon more nearly pays its way. Only then it is used more frequently in semi-automatic firing, and its power is more evenly distributed over the course of the engagement. Sufficient to note that this was not the purpose for which the carbine was intended or the object for which it was changed to full automatic.

RANGE AND EFFECT

There are practically no data bearing on the accuracy of the carbine at ranges in excess of 50 yards. The record contains a few examples of carbine-aimed fire felling an enemy soldier at this distance or perhaps a little more. But they are so few in number that no general conclusion can be drawn from them. Where carbine fire had proved killing effect, approximately 95 percent of the time the target was dropped at less than 50 yards.

Because of the frequency of hand-to-hand fighting in Korea operations, there has been a suitable opportunity for judging of the takedown characteristics of the carbine round when delivered at close range.

This is not a source of general complaint. However, there is some illuminating comment. In the approximately 50 infantry actions covered, there were in all 7 witnesses who said that they had fired at an enemy soldier under conditions where there was no doubt that the bullet had struck him in a vital part of the body, and that he had kept on coming. One such witness is 1st Lt Joseph R. Fisher, 1st Marine Regiment. He was speaking of the defense at Hagaru-ri. The 1st Marine Division regarded him as one of its ablest and most objective company commanders. These were his words:

“About 30 percent of our carbines gave us trouble; some wouldn’t fire at all; others responded sluggishly. But the main reason my men lost confidence in the carbine was because they would put a bullet right in a Chink’s chest at 25 yards range, and he wouldn’t stop. This happened to me. The bullet struck home; the man simply winced and kept on coming. There were about half a dozen of my men made this same complaint：some of them swore they had fired three or four times, hit the man each time, and still not stopped him.”