主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年） -- 徐荣

ROCKETLAUNCHERS

A MARGINAL WEAPON?

Due to the enemy’s lack of armor in winter operations 1950-51, this group of

weapons had little decisive effect in the local fighting, except as CCF contrived to

capture some of our weapons and employ them against our metal. They did not prove

inexpert in exploiting the opportunity. There are a number of examples in the record

of CCF using the rocket launcher against our tanks, field pieces, and vehicles at comparatively

short range (15 to 50 yards) and scoring killing hits. The tank-killing weapons

all involve this special jeopardy; no other materiel can be converted more quickly and

decisively to enemy use upon capture, particularly when armor, being unopposed by

its own kind, relaxes it’s normal precautions.

火箭筒

边缘武器？

由于敌人在1950-51年的行动中缺乏装甲兵器，火箭筒这种兵器在实际战斗中并没有发挥巨大的作用。当然中共军队操作缴获的我们的火箭筒来打击我们的情况除外。事实证明，他们专长于利用这样的机会。比较我们的使用情况，有很多的中共战斗例子表明，他们用火箭筒在极近的距离（15到50码）打击我们的坦克，战地目标，和机动车辆并获得很多战绩。这种坦克杀手武器造成了极度危险，没有任何一种其他武器能够被敌人缴获，并且被敌人很快使用并且成为他们的主要武器。特别是对我们的装甲车辆，自以为无敌，放松警惕的时候。

In the winter fighting, our bazooka fire was used mainly against machine guns,

buildings where enemy skirmishers had taken cover, and other large objects. There

was less of a tendency to employ it at short range against enemy personnel, in substitute

for mortar fire. The data are insufficient to warrant saying whether the launcher justifies

its place in the infantry company weapons system under the conditions in which the

CCF was engaged by our line during the winter. There are some graphic examples

of its killing effect in the crises of a number of local engagements; these are well outnumbered

by the operational narratives in which the launchers are accounted as present,

but have no influence upon the course of combat. From the data - which are admitt’edly

an inconclusive sample - it is indicated only that the launcher is a marginal

weapon when the enemy lacks armor. With few exceptions, its telling shots could have

been contrived by some other weapon present with the line. In other words, it did

not have unique advantages in infantry-against-infant’ry action, as it was used in the

average tactical situation.

在冬季战斗中，我们的巴祖卡主要用来摧毁敌方机枪，敌方占据的建筑物和其他大目标。并没有将其作为迫击炮的替代火力用于短距离战术对抗中的趋势。在冬天中共军队突破我军防线的战斗中，也缺乏数据证明火箭筒在步兵连武器系统中是否处于恰当地位。有一些例子说明在战斗关键时刻他的杀伤效果影响了局势。不过，现在的火箭筒战斗的描述非常夸张，实际上却并没有影响战斗的过程。从数据看——在一些不确定的例子中——当敌人缺乏装甲力量时，火箭筒实际上成为边缘武器。只有少数例外，火箭筒和其他武器一同在战场上使用。换句话说，在其被使用的战术行动中，他并不是步兵对抗中独一无二的优势兵器。

By t’he account of our average line officer in Korea, under the conditions of the

fighting there, the 3.5 launcher is of greater utility in any situation than the small

bazooka, and he sees no argument for retention of the latter within the infantry weapons

system. It becomes excess baggage as soon as the 3.5 is in good supply. But the question

cannot be resolved that easily. If it is true that the small bazooka is an effective antipersonnel

weapon, but that its potential has not been adequately exploited because of

a hiatus in training, then its extra portability may give it advantage over the 3.5 in

particular situations, for the same reason’ that the 60-mm mortar is useful, though the

81 has greater killing radius. Further light on the subject may come from study of an

incident in which the small launcher was given decisive use against human targets.

在我们普通韩国战地指挥官的考量中，结合这里的战斗条件，3.5寸的火箭筒在任何情况下都要比小巴祖卡有用的多，他们认为没有必要在步兵武器系统内列装后者。这造成，大量3.5寸火箭筒补充充裕。问题的解决可没那么容易。如果说巴祖卡作为一种有效的反单兵武器是正确的，也会因其操作手缺乏训练而限制其潜力的发挥，但由于其优于3.5寸超级巴祖卡的便携性，使他可以很好的替代超级巴祖卡——依据同样理由，尽管，81毫米的杀伤效果明显好，60毫米的迫击炮的使用更方便。这个项目的进一步明朗可能要取决于89毫米火箭筒是否能够在对抗步兵目标时取得绝对性作用研究。

THE BAZOOKA AGAINST MEN

用巴祖卡对抗步兵攻击

In the attack of the 1st Marine Division from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, the 5th

Marines assumed defense of the whole Hagaru-ri perimeter as the column got underway.

To ease the initial progress of the column, it was necessary to gain the high ground

east of the camp which had been held by CCF throughout the siege. The Regiment’s

Second Battalion was given the mission and soon won the heights. Prior to the action,

it had been reckoned that the Division as a whole would be able to clear Hagaru-ri by

nightfall. But fighting along the road had delayed the 7th Regiment and the Division

trains, so that the lead elements of the 5th Regiment had still not cleared by dark.

在陆战一师从Hagaru-ri到Koto-ri的攻击战斗中，陆战五团负责防守整个Hagaru-ri以掩护主力通过。为了让先遣车队通过，有必要占领营地东侧被中共军队占领的山林高地。五团二营负责执行这个任务，并且很快占据一些制高点。在行动前，预计傍晚时分全师可以通过Hagaru-ri。但一路上的战斗迟滞了陆战七团和师车队。导致陆战五团到夜间也未能撤离。

Easy Company held ground eastward of the river from a point approximately

700 yards north of the Hagaru-ri bridge around to the bottom of the main hill and

back along the railway track for about 200 yards. The right flank of the Company

ran along the railway approximately 400 yards east and north of the bridge. Between

1800 and 2000, the Chinese attacked from the high ground toward the bridge with the

apparent object of cutting off troops manning the western half of the perimeter.

Easy’s rocket team had been so stationed by Capt Sam Jeskilka that it could

fire straight up a draw which ran halfway up the hill then forked off into gullys. This

was the natural approach from the hill, as it was otherwise barren of cover. The Chinese

pressed forward along the alley, and during an attack which persisted in strength for

two hours and recurred intermittently through the night, this key feature was defended

by rockets.

E连占据的高地在河东侧约700码处，Hagaru-ri桥北边靠近主要山地的山脚，背后离铁路线大约200码。连的右翼沿铁路线400米延伸到桥的东北侧。在18时到20时之间，中国人从山林高地上冲下来，通过桥梁意图消灭环形防线西半部的守军。E连的火箭筒组正好由山姆 杰斯克里卡上尉指挥能够直接打击半山腰的溪沟。这里比较靠近山顶，没有多少植被。中国人沿着小路向上冲，一直持续了整整2个小时，并且在整个晚上也要反复冲锋。火箭筒守住了关键阵地。

On the following morning, CCF pulled back into the hills. Co1 R. L. Murray,

commander of the 5th Regiment, and Lt Co1 Hal Roise entered the draw and made a

cursory examination of the damage done by the 2.36 fire. There were more than 50

bodies on the ground, scattered anywhere from 20 yards to 200 yards from the launcher

position.

到次日清晨时，中共军队被迫退回到山里去。于是，陆战五团的指挥官R L 马里上校和哈尔 罗易斯中校草草视察了使用89毫米火箭弹的战场。发现沿着火箭筒位置从20码到200码的距离上有超过50具尸体。

Murray’s most amazing comment on the result was that his inspection of bodies

convinced him that practically all of the Chinese had died from burns - that WP

rounds had set their padded clothing afire. Jeskilka estimated more conservatively

that 60 percent of the deaths were due to burns and the rest to concussion and fragmentation.

His crew had fired quite a few HEAT rounds from the launchers. Jeskilka

said that while the Hagaru-ri affair was Easy’s outstanding use of' the launcher, the

Company had become habituated to using it as an anti-personnel weapon at every

opportunity. It was therefore normal for the men to have final confidence in it in an

extreme emergency.

马里对大部分中国人尸体致命伤的检查结果十分震惊——这些伤口都是都是由于衣服的燃烧造成的。杰斯克里卡保守估计大约有60％的死者是由于烧伤，其他的则是冲击震荡和碎片杀伤。他的部下发射火箭弹时也有一些被尾焰烧伤。杰斯克里卡说由于在Hagaru-ri中，E连使用火箭筒的效果，这个连现在变得一有机会就用这种对抗步兵目标的武器。因此，人们对使用火箭筒有极高的热情和信心。

In the November fight against CCF along the Chongchon River, one of the most

mobile and aggressively successful defenses conducted anywhere along the American

line was the action by Company F, 38th Infantry Regiment. From a detailed and

lengthy narrative of this action, the following extract is made to illustrate the effect

of one 3.5 round upon the engagement:

在11月，沿Chongchon河，与中共军队的战斗中，38团F连的战斗是诸多美军防线随处可见的成功融合机动性和进攻性防御案例之一。从一份详细描述这支部队战斗的报告中，如下的描述是一个反应了3.5寸火箭筒情况的简报

“When the squad on the right flank of 3rd Platoon was withdrawn by Sgt Smith

because of the buildup of CCF fire against the nose of the ridge, that action left the

machine gun on the left flank of 1st Platoon’s position as the chief block to the enemy’s

main advance up the draw. There was a native hut to the right and forward of the

machine gun. Lt Lemuel English, who was in command of 1st Platoon, had one of his

BAR men, PFC Cleo Wachel, dug in right next to the house along the right rear corner.

Wachel was thus in line to assist the machine gun in covering the draw, and in fact,

as the fight developed, he bore the brunt of the defense. There were sandbags revetting

his foxhole. He could deliver a grazing fire right down the gut without unduly exposing

himself.

由于中共军队的火力点在山脊前伸处建立起来，3排右翼的那个班在斯密斯中士的指挥下撤退，只留下一挺机枪在1排的左翼阻止敌人的进一步进攻。在机枪的右前侧有一间小屋。1排排长莱弭尔 英格兰中士手下有一个巴祖卡发射手，一等兵克莱奥 瓦彻尔。他在房屋的右后侧挖了一个散兵坑。这样，瓦彻尔可以协助机枪手火力覆盖，事实上，当战斗激烈时，他也一同承受进攻的压力。有一些沙包堆积掩护了他的散兵坑，这样他可以在腰以下的高度发射而不用暴露自己。

“English deployed three riflemen to the rear of Wachel; they were told to fire

in time with Wachel and to cut down any skirmishers making a sneak run toward his

position. As the Chinese came up the footpath, Wachel was first to open fire on them.

He had to be pretty delicate about it. Some of the GIs from 3rd Platoon had been withdrawing

along this same path, and he wasn’t sure that they had all cleared. So, in the

darkness, it was a problem to make certain that he was firing on an enemy target.

英格兰部属三名步枪手在瓦彻尔的后侧，他们被告知和瓦彻尔一同行动，并且切断任何迂回瓦彻尔攻击位置的偷袭行为。当中国人开始从小路上冲时，瓦彻尔率先开火。他必须十分小心。3排的其他士兵都从这条路上往上撤，而他不能肯定他们都上来了。特别是在由于晚上。他很难确定是否准确打中敌人目标。

“The Chinese got to within 25 yards of the BAR. Wachel challenged them, and

they opened fire with two tommy guns. Then Wachel let them have a burst. Even

so, they did not go flat. Only a few moved at a time, and they came on in short rushes,

taking cover behind the rocks or at the far side of the house, but remaining standing.

Immediately after the first skirmishers moved up, the Chinese set up a machine gun

on the flat ground directly in front of the BAR position. Both Wachel and the riflemen

behind him took the gun under fire, but they couldn’t get a clear idea of its position

though it was less than 100 yards distant, and it continued to fire away. More of the

Chinese worked up to the house and took positions next it, with only the building separating

them from Wachel. Grenades began to come in on 1st Platoon’s left flank, but

the throwing was inaccurate and the explosions didn’t worry the men. Then WacheI

had a sudden idea; he set the house ablaze by firing into the roof. The thatch burned

brightly and the scene became well illuminated. Together, the light and the heat drove

back the Chinese who had moved in next the house. The machine gun kept firing.

当中国人离巴祖卡只有25码时，瓦彻尔开火攻击，而敌人也用两支汤姆冲锋枪还击。然后瓦彻尔发射了一枚火箭。然而敌人并没有卧倒，而是持续冲锋，又冲了一段后，找岩石掩护，在离房子较远的距离，则仍然是站着的。第一波散兵攻击一开始，中国人就在巴祖卡前面平坦的地方架起了机枪。瓦彻尔和他后面的步枪手用枪还击，但他们对前方100码以上的目标没有任何概念。只是持续开火。越来越多的中国人冲到房屋边上，并且占据了这个和瓦彻尔只有一墙之隔的有利位置。手榴弹开始投到1排的左侧，只是精度不够还不足以威胁到他们。这时瓦彻尔有了奇想，他点燃了屋顶。屋顶迅速被烧亮并且照亮了周围的情况。光和热驱退了那些冲到房屋边的中国人。机枪又开始持续开火了。

“In a few minutes, from ground to the rear of the machine gun, the Chinese

opened fire with a 60-mm mortar against 1st Platoon’s left flank and the CP position.

Very quickly, they unloaded about 20 rounds on this critical area. Lt Stevens, Lt

Coleman, Lt Benson, and five enlisted men were hit by the mortar fire. Lt John N.

Knight moved one of the Company’s 60 mortars out to the left of the platoon’s line and

opened fire on the enemy mortar; for several minutes there was a direct duel between

the two pieces, with both crews serving their weapons about equally. Then the Chinese

dropped one round right amid the mortar crew. Three men were wounded, and though

the tube was not damaged, it ceased fire temporarily. Sitting a little way up the slope

from Wachel and the machine gun was Sgt Paul West, with a 3.5 launcher in his lap.

几分钟内，从开阔地到机枪巢后面，中国人用60毫米迫击炮打击1排的左翼和中部防线。很快他们就在这狭窄的地域投下20发迫击炮弹。斯蒂文中士，克莱曼中士，拜森中士和其他五名士兵立即中弹负伤。约翰 N 莱特中士移来一门连直属的60毫米迫击炮到排阵地的左外侧，开火压制敌人迫击炮。双方炮击位置互相对射了几分钟。随后中国人的一发炮弹准确命中炮位。虽然炮没有被打坏，不过三名炮兵都负伤了，直接导致迫击炮哑火，在瓦彻尔和机枪点后面斜坡上一点点距离是保罗 维斯特中士，他的手边正好有一具3.5寸火箭筒。

He had been watching the action, but so far had taken no part in it. So he raised the

launcher and let. go one rocket,. His first round hit the Chinese mortar dead on - at

225 yards range. It was the luckiest kind of a fluke shot. That cooled off the enemy

force attncking up the draw. When the mortar and crew were knocked out, their

machine gun went silent. The pressure was then deflected to an entirely new quarter.”

他观察了整个过程，但并没有参加战斗。于是他举起火箭筒，发射了一枚火箭弹。第一轮就命中了225码远的中国人迫击炮位。十分幸运的射击。这直接压制了敌人的进攻。随着迫击炮和迫击炮组被敲掉。他们的机枪也沉寂下来。压力缓解了一刻钟。

l In the defense of Hagaru-ri, Company I, 1st Marine Regiment, knocked out

two Hotchkiss machine guns at 150 yards range, using the 3.5 launcher at night. One

other gun was knocked out at somewhat shorter range. The crew commented that

they had to light> matches to set the sights on the launcher. They said that luminous

sights are badly needed for night operations.

在Hagaru-ri的防御中，陆战1团I连在夜间150码的距离上用3.5寸火箭筒敲掉两挺哈开斯奇重机枪（可能是日制6.5mm三年式重机枪）。还有一挺是在近一些的距离上。火箭筒手评价说，他们只有划亮火柴来照亮火箭筒，而在夜间行动中，这样的亮光是十分需要的。