主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年)II -- 徐荣

敌军进攻的特点

根据我军步兵连的战斗经验的描述，中共军队的进攻在运转中有这些共同点，所有这些特点当相互联系起来分析时显得特别重要：（1）中共军队总是从北面沿倾斜方向接近美军的环形阵地；（2） 我军发现中国人在接敌行动中行军方向与河床、公路或小径平行；（3）他们以密集纵队接敌；（4）在许多情况下，虽然这些纵队保持快步行进，但看上去仍十分有活力；（5）每个敌军士兵都是自给自足的个体，携带自身的给养；（6）敌军通过低地实施战术退却；（7）在整条战线上，他们的几次总攻都发生一个相当短的时间段内。

当中共军队向横跨清川江两岸的第八集团军进攻时，敌军看上去是沿从西北到东南的轴线运动的。在局部攻势中，由于地势走向和初战有时以意外方式爆发，他们在战术上可能背离这一方向， 但这种背离出现的次数极少。在第八集团军作战地幅的最右端，南朝鲜第二军崩溃之后，（中共军队）从北、东北和东面向我第38步兵团施加压力。但当主力会战开始后，敌军也是按照规定好的路线行军的。

参照地图（图块“德川 6433-IV”），清川江谷地从东北向西南割裂该地区，直达黄海。在紧靠球场北面的村庄——第2步兵师的炮兵基地——西侧的支流向东南方汇入清川江。但在清川江东岸，支流和谷地向西北方汇入干流。

敌军在清川江西侧支流河谷并在第八集团军西北方的任何集结、增援和脱离（如11月25日的情况），是沿流向清川江的水流方向的，并且敌军在横越该河时，将继续沿着最有利于徒步行军的方向前进，通常沿东南走向的轴线，这样他们一开始就将同时打击第2步兵师的步兵和炮兵阵地。

至此，讨论到的这些战术现象清楚地揭示了中共军队是如何发动及发展进攻的。关于中共军队迂回第2步兵师右翼之前粉碎该师正面的首次突击，不存在相抵触的资料。在当天同一小时，中共军队对第25步兵师位于上九洞以北的正面发动的攻击从相反方向施加压力的，这是他们发动协同攻击的又一项情报。上九洞差不多在球场正西，位于清川江的一条主要支流——九龙江附近。隐蔽在这两条河谷中的中共军队向同一条分水岭的两侧发动了方向完全相反的卷击。

下图是概略图而不是地理意义上的地图，绘出它的目的也仅在于粗略地揭示中共军队酝酿其攻势时最可能采用的手段：

第八集团军正面几个地段上的战术发展同时发生，在回顾中考虑到这一点特别给人以启发。11月25日10时，位于第2步兵师最前线的第9步兵团B连遭遇到了坚定顽强、寸步不让的中共掩蔽部队。在同一小时内，第25步兵师的前锋游骑兵连进攻清川江西岸的8号目标时也有同样的经历。游骑兵连到黄昏仍未夺取该高地，最后我军不得不以密集炮火轰击敌军的堑壕阵地，才击破他们的固守。此外，敌军机动打击部队突破第25步兵师正面的进攻发生在当天18时，与此同时，敌军也攻击了第2步兵师。

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENEMY ATTACK

From the descriptions of the combat experience of the infantry companies there were drawn these other common denominators of CCF movement in the attack, all highly significant when related one to the other: (1) CCF almost invariably approached at an oblique to the northward-facing American perimeters; (2) when seen in movement during the approach, the Chinese were following stream beds, or roads or paths parallel to them; (3) they made the approach in solid columns; (4) these columns, though in instances proceeding at double time, appeared fairly fresh; (5) each was a self-sufficient unit, carrying its own supply; (6) when in tactical retrograde, they withdrew via the low ground; and (7) along the whole front, their several general offensive movements all occurred within a relatively limited time bracket.

In the CCF attack against Eighth Army astride the Chongchon, the enemy appeared to be moving generally on an axis running from NW to SE. In the local attack, there would be tactical deviations from this, according to the fall of the ground and the accidental manner in which initial engagement sometimes took place, though these deviations were relatively few in number. On the far right of the sector, after the collapse of II ROK Corps, attack against the 38th Infantry was pressed from the North, Northeast, and East. But when the main battle opened, the line of march was as stated.

Referring to the map (map sheet Tokchon 6433-IV), it will be seen that the Chongchon River trench cuts through this area running from Northeast to Southwest all the way to the Yellow Sea. In the country immediately to the North of Kujangdong -2nd Div’s Arty base - the Chongchon’s feeder valleys to the westward run Southeast toward the river. But along the east bank, the feeder valleys and streams run Northwest to their confluence with the main river.

Thus if any enemy concentration, built up and hidden away in the feeder valleys west of the stream and to the Northwest of the Eighth Army’s northward-facing front as on 25 November, was to proceed via the line of water flow toward the Chongchon and, on crossing the river, was to continue its advance along the avenues most favorable for quick movement by foot, it would proceed always on a Southeast-running axis, and so doing would come in against both the infantry and artillery positions of 2nd Infantry Division initially at a Northwest to Southeast oblique.

The tactical phenomena heretofore discussed suggested clearly that this was how CCF had mounted its attack and then proceeded to execute it. As to the opening blow which crushed the front of 2nd Division prior to the turning movement against its right flank, there are no discrepant data. That the attack against the 25th Division front North of Ipsok, on the same day at the same hour, was pressed from the opposite direction is one more item in corroboration. Ipsok is almost due west of Kujang-dong, near the Kuryong-gang - a main tributary of the Chongchon. The CCF, from their hidings in the feeder valleys of the two streams, were simply rolling down the opposite side of the same watershed.

The following chart is diagrammatic rather than geographical and its purpose is only to give a rough indication of the manner in which the CCF offensive is most likely to have matured:

The coincidence of tactical developments along the several parts of Eighth Army’s front becomes especially instructive when considered in retrospect. It was at 1000 on 25 November that Baker of the 9th Infantry, in the forefront of 2nd Division, encountered the tough, unyielding screen of Chinese which fought for its last yard of ground. At exactly the same hour, the Ranger Company, at the forefront of 25th Division, was having an identical experience in its attack on objective No. 8 west of the Chongchon. The Rangers did not take the hill until just before dark, and finally the Chinese hold had to be broken by an intense artillery shelling against the enemy’s dug in positions. Again, the attack of the mobile hitting forces of the enemy broke against 25th Division’s front at 1800 hours on that same day, just as it did against 2nd Division.

完全从研究步兵连战斗经验而得出的这些资料和一般性现象，（使得研究人员）做出了下列试验性的推论，并将其呈递，供高层司令部考虑：

研究人员）做出了下列试验性的推论并将其呈递，供高层司令部考虑：

（1）中共军队的主要作战兵力并未配置在高地，而是组成了一个机动集群，这个集群在夜间沿主要公路推进，隐蔽在主攻击线两侧的支流河谷中，并在那里准备应对我军向干流河谷的进攻（或前进）。

（2）这个集群可能由许多散布在相当广大地区的小型机动部队组成，但在任何情况下单个部队都保持紧密集中，准备就绪，可迅速运动。

（3）他们未被我军的空中侦察发现，由此显示他们系统地运用了某种形式的表面掩护。

（4）因为缺少茂密的林区，北朝鲜的村庄看来是唯一适合达成此目的的掩护。

（5）中共军队的纪律或许要求所有的机动打击部队在分段进军期间白天都要保持隐蔽。

（6）（中共军队）很可能也以同样的方式利用了矿坑、洞穴等地形。

（7）中共军队实施了与其机动集群具有战术联系的掩蔽防御，这些掩蔽部队在干流两岸的高地或其他通道上驻守。

（8）因此，中共军队沿特定战线的抵抗突然增强意味着：进攻者进入了危险的时刻和区域，面临着向心攻击的威胁。

（9）中共军队的这道防御屏障既是发起进攻的“击发装置”又是迟滞部队，为它的主力提供了出发和推进所需的时间间隔。

（10）我军未发现任何证据支持以下假定：中共军队的机动反击部队在集结起来准备进攻之前，是部署在山顶的守军的一部分。

（11）对时间间隔的研究显然排除了上述假定成立的任何可能。

（12）因此，比起散布在山顶和岭脊的工事，更应当到低地去寻找敌军主力。尽管失败会削弱中共军队攻势的机动性和信心，但敌军是会逐渐恢复过来的。

（13）这项关于敌军可能采取的总体部署的展望暗示了我军空中行动应采取的方式。

（14）在我军侧翼实施远距离巡逻行动的必要性一目了然。

（15）关于中共军队是否集中在村庄地区，（指挥官）应慎重对待空军提交的否定的报告，空军的报告只有通过战术检验才能作为最终结论加以采纳。

From these data and general indications, arrived at exclusively from the study of infantry company experience, the following tentative deductions were made and forwarded for the consideration of higher command:

(1) CCF’s main battle strength was not being disposed to the high ground but was composed of a maneuver mass, which, being brought forward by night along the main roads, was at the appropriate point marched by the flank, concealed in the feeder valleys off the MSR and there held in readiness for our attack (or advance) up the main river valley.

(2) This mass was probably composed of numerous small maneuver groups distributed over a fairly wide area, but in any case the individual groups remained closely concentrated and ready for prompt movement.

(3) They had not been detected by our air reconnaissance; therefore the systematic employment of some form of surface cover was indicated.

(4) In the absence of any thickly forested area, NK villages seemed to be the only cover suitable to this purpose.

(5) CCF discipline probably required that all such mobile hitting forces remain under cover throughout daylight during the staging period.

(6) Mine shafts, caves, etc., were likely to be employed in the same manner.

(7) CCF employed a screen defense put forth in practical tactical relationship to this maneuver mass and established on the high ground on both sides of the main river valley - or other approach avenue.

(8) Any sudden hardening of CCF resistance along one definite line was therefore a signal that the attacker was in the danger hour and area, under threat from concentrations drawn up off his flanks.

(9) The defensive screen was in effect both a trigger mechanism and a delaying force, providing the main body with the interval needed to mount up and get forward:

(10) No warrant was to be found for any assumption that CCF counter-hitting mobility derived from garrisons which had been disposed along the ridge tops prior to assembly for the attack.

(11) The study of time intervals appeared to exclude any such possibility.

(12) The main body of the enemy army was therefore to be sought on low ground, rather than in works scattered among the hilltops and ridge crests, though as defeat began to reduce CCF offensive mobility and confidence, the pendulum would swing gradually in the other direction.

(13) This outlook as to the probable general dispositions of the enemy suggested the pattern which should be taken by our air operations.

(14) The need for wider-ranging patrol actions toward the flanks was plainly indicated.

(15) Negative air reports concerning CCF concentrations in village areas should be treated with a considerable reserve, and should be accepted as conclusive only when confirmed by tactical proof.

这个“案例”的论据最初是由军事行动研究中心主任埃利斯 约翰逊博士口头提出，他随后又将它简化成著述。后来，对陆战1师在长津湖附近与中共军队的历次战斗的研究以更完整的细节证实了该理论。因为长津湖会战是一个漫长的事件，（研究人员）有充足的机会去观察中共军队各机动部队之间的关系，中共军队沿高地构筑的工事形成了一道防御屏障，中共机动部队驻守在这道屏障附近的村庄内。我们的北朝鲜间谍前来报告中共士兵楔入了村舍内，好像鱼进了罐头。尽管如此，空军侦查了这些位置，报告“未发现目标”。最终，由于地面部队指挥官们确信：关于村子的情形这些北朝鲜当地人肯定讲了实话，他们命令实施针对这些村庄的轰炸。当炸弹开始落下，村子像花盆一样被掀开，到处暴露出敌军士兵。中共士兵如此顽强地坚持村庄掩护，以至于飞行员观察到：甚至在执行轰炸任务的飞机返航之前，幸存的敌军士兵就返回了被炸坏的临时营房。

最后，再次强调：这些主张属于对地面战斗中的敌军的更进一步的判读，它们完全是在步兵排级单位收集和核对的情报基础上加工成形的。

而且，它们逐渐演变为事后的反思和对一项分析步兵线上直接交火的战斗中敌我效能的研究的副产品。从我方情报来源了解到的处于原始状态的情报与从中共军队战俘那里得到的战场情报并不完全吻合。这项工作无人可用，而且(指挥官们)还没有完全预见到该项工作的重要性。因此，审问工作并未侧重于这项特定目标，而且我方很多可能的丰富情报来源（例如，在德川以南被击败的南朝鲜部队）还未被发掘。

因此，（研究人员）认为该项工作呈现出的情况是不完整和令人不满的。尽管连队的资料都具有相同的指示性，但关于敌军如何集结的真实情况，它们还不是最终结论，还有很多问题没有得到解答。

The argument for this “case” was first presented orally and was then reduced to writing by Dr. Ellis Johnson, Director of ORO. Subsequently, the study of operations by the 1st Marine Division against CCF in the vicinity of the Chosen Reservoir substantiated the theory in rather complete detail. Because the battle there was a prolonged affair, there was ample opportunity to observe the relationship of the maneuver groups which holed-up in the nearby villages to the defensive screen dug in along the high ground. NK agents (friendly to us) came forward and reported that CCF troops were wedged into the village huts like fish in a can. Still, the air, reconnoitering these locations, reported “negative.” Finally, air bombing operations were ordered against the villages because the ground commanders became convinced that the Korean natives must be telling the truth about the situation. When the bombs began to drop, the villages opened up like flower pots, spilling enemy troops in all directions. CCF’s hold on village cover was so tenacious that pilots observed surviving enemy soldiers returning to the bomb-shattered hutments even before the planes used in the strike had withdrawn from the vicinity.

In conclusion, it is reemphasized only that these propositions, appertaining to the larger design of the enemy in ground operations, were formed exclusively on the basis of information collected and reconciled at the level of the infantry rifle platoon.

Furthermore, they evolved only as an afterthought and as the minor by-product of a search which was pointed directly at the analysis of enemy and friendly effects in the direct-fire engagement along the rifle line. What was learned from our own sources was, in the nature of the case, imperfectly integrated with the battlefield information gained from CCF POWs. There was no personnel available for the work and, furthermore, the importance of the object had not been adequately foreseen. Hence interrogations were not slanted to the serving of this specific end, and many perhaps fertile sources of information on our side (for example, the ROK units which had been beaten south of Tokchon) were not explored.

The exposition of the subject is therefore considered incomplete and unsatisfactory. Though the company data all point in one direction, in so far as the nature of the enemy buildup is concerned, they are not conclusive, and many questions remain unanswered.