主题：【译】中国军队对猛烈炮击的战术反应 -- 徐荣

After June 1951

After June 1951, with the front line roughly along the 38th Parallel, the CCF began to employ a position-type defense along a main line of resistance. In order to withstand intense UN air and artillery bombardment, the CCF deployed units in great depth along narrow fronts and erected an elaborate system of field fortifications with extended outposts and key terrain features organized for an all-around defense. Primary defensive positions were commonly placed on the forward slope, with personnel shelters on the reverse slope. The forward defensive trenches had shelter holes for individual soldiers dug into the bottom at intervals of several feet. Recesses for storing hand grenades were dug into the sides. Tunnels and alternate trenches connected the forward slope defensive positions and the personnel shelters. Ammunition storage spaces were also connected with the defensive positions by trenches. All positions were constructed to provide cover from high-angle fire while still maintaining good fields of fire. The fortifications on hilltops were covered with alternate layers of logs and dirt to a depth of up to fifteen feet. From three to twelve layers of logs were used, depending on their availability.10

In addition to digging in to provide cover, the CCF also used the terrain, natural vegetation, darkness, unfavorable weather conditions, and smoke to cover its movements. In forward areas, marches took place at night, with the men walking in single file three to five paces apart. Secondary roads and trails were used, and march discipline was very strict. The Chinese launched attacks only at night or during poor weather, unless the opportunity for a major success clearly outweighed the extra casualties to be taken in a daytime operation. If an objective was to be held, the attack began early enough in the evening so that the battle would be over by midnight. The rest of the night could then be spent digging in and organizing a defensive position. Attacks designed to delay or halt UN advances began early enough to allow an end to the engagement by daybreak. Planned withdrawals took place under cover of darkness and only rarely were supported by mortar or artillery fire. According to Chinese prisoners of war, this was done because, if CCF soldiers opened fire, they immediately became primary targets for UN artillery.11

Camouflage was another CCF defense against UN artillery. Unit commanders paid great attention to the initial camouflaging of their positions and instructed their troops to always take maximum advantage of natural cover and concealment. Troops dug foxholes very carefully and not only concealed the hole with natural vegetation but also scattered the dirt around to avoid attracting attention. When resting outside of foxholes, the troops would scatter about under trees or other natural cover, always keeping a distance of at least ten feet between them. If an aircraft approached, the men would freeze in place in order not to disclose their position by movement. This kind of camouflage discipline often saved CCF units from detection while they were on the march or crossing open terrain. The uniform caps worn by CCF soldiers had loops on them for attaching natural vegetation, and this helped them blend in with their surroundings. The CCF also was careful to camouflage mortars, artillery pieces, and all vehicles near the front. Although mortar firing positions were almost always in cleared areas, after firing five to ten rounds, crews would place the mortar in a camouflaged hole some ten yards from the firing position and then take shelter in individual foxholes. To heighten the effect of camouflage, the Chinese made decoys using materials found at hand. They stuffed straw into discarded clothing to create realistic dummy riflemen and also constructed dummy artillery positions using logs for barrels, steel plates for shields, boards for trails, and straw for wheels.12 Although made with simple material, these decoys were realistic enough to attract a significant amount of UN fire. So effective were CCF camouflage efforts that, according to a report written by the U.S. IX Corps G2 in September 1951, they were a major reason for the CCFs ability to survive in the face of constant aerial surveillance and fierce bombardment by UN forces.13

Conclusion

The Communist Chinese Forces reduced casualties from UN firepower in three ways:

• The CCF reduced the scale of offensive operations. Initially, the CCF had planned and initiated operations intended to destroy UN division-sized units. The need to defend against massive UN artillery, however, forced the CCF to change its focus to planning operations designed to destroy company and battalion-sized units. It became obvious to the CCF very soon that the concentrations of men and materiel required for large-scale operations created too many good targets for UN air and artillery forces.

• The CCF dispersed troops and supplies and protected them underground as much as possible.

• The CCF exerted every effort to counter UN target acquisition efforts through the effective use of cover and concealment. By using these defensive measures, the CCF, a force whose firepower was decidedly inferior to that of the UN Command, maintained enough combat power in the field to allow the Chinese government to achieve certain strategic objectives in Korea. If success is defined by achieving political-military objectives, Communist Chinese defensive measures against UN artillery were successful.