主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年） -- 徐荣

迫击炮族

我军迫击炮族的整体表现卓越。这几种迫击炮能够充分地服务于战术意图。所有这三种口径——4.2英寸，81mm和60mm的迫击炮都得到了广泛应用。在由朝鲜地形所造成的各种环境中，每一种口径的迫击炮在支援火力的合理规划中都扮演了独特的角色。

比起二战中我军的军事行动，在朝鲜的步兵战斗中可能更典型化地体现为激烈的迫击炮战。步兵指挥官们了解了更多迫击炮的相关知识，也比以前更有把握发挥迫击炮的全部潜能。

朝鲜——无穷无尽、层峦叠嶂的崇山峻岭——是迫击炮大显身手的天然舞台。因为中国敌人在夜袭中努力于近距离压制我方阵地，而当我军知晓敌军发动进攻时，敌军散兵线已经隐蔽起来预防我军炮击了，所以迫击炮就被赋予了多种多样的决定性射击任务。

限制迫击炮在战斗中发挥作用的主要因素通常是弹药不足而非运用生疏。每一级指挥官都能充分了解迫击炮的作用。

产生这种限制因素的原因已经很清楚了。步兵营，某些时候是个别的步兵连，坚守阵地，要在主抵抗线上与其他部队的分遣队保持联系。这支部队可能在其最近的支援单位左右1500～000码，支援它的野战炮兵前2000～4000码的地方。这支部队的阵地通常位于前线的山顶或山脊，或位于能掩护河床和公路的一夫当关、万夫莫开的隘口。最近的补给站要将补给送上这些山头，也必须进行长途拖运。因此，由于弹药装载量的限制，被投入战场的是威力多少有些小的60mm迫击炮。如果81mm迫击炮也被前送，那么一般情况下它们将会短缺弹药。

通常60mm迫击炮的阵地位于我军高地反斜面的洼地或山脚下。在防御时，通常在指挥所附近设置迫击炮群。在进攻时，当我军尖兵向地平线前进时，需要在洼地或山沟寻找一处接近地平线的阵地以隐蔽迫击炮。当进攻局部阵地时，中共军队几乎从不使用从后方全力冲击的战术，他们习惯于沿正面或侧翼的缓坡（特别是覆盖着树木和灌木丛的缓坡）发动进攻。因此，对我方连队的伴随迫击炮最主要威胁是敌方迫击炮的火力。

然而无论将迫击炮配置在作战半径内还是大部队的后方，较重型的迫击炮总能从远距离支援作战。由于朝鲜是个多丘陵的国度，而且敌人缺乏空中支援和强大炮兵，这便是一项实实在在的火力优势。

对方的炮兵如果给我军的迫击炮带来危险，步枪防线后数百码内也总是有可隐蔽地架起迫击炮的地方。常常出现这种情况：只要地面最适合安置迫击炮，能以水平视角向敌军占据的山头发射炮弹，且在敌军发射子弹的火器的有效射程之外，81mm迫击炮和4.2英寸迫击炮就大胆地架设在空旷地。

81mm迫击炮，4.2英寸迫击炮，75mm无后坐力炮，有时包括多用途防空武器，在一个炮兵群内从同一位置向一个宽大目标实施集火射击，这种情况也不少见。这是在白天的战斗中为进攻提供支援的火力配置方式。这种紧密协同的合同射击中各武器的激烈竞争往往导致弹药的过度消耗。

MORTARS

THE FAMILY

The general performance by the family of mortars has been excellent. The several mortars serve the tactical need quite adequately. All three -the 4.2, 81-mm, and 60-mm - are given extensive use. Under the conditions imposed by the Korean terrain, each type has its particular role in the development of a balanced program of supporting fires.

Strong mortar action is perhaps more generally characteristic of the pattern of infantry fighting in Korea than of our operations during World War II. Infantry commanders have greater awareness of the mortar and are more likely to make full use of the mortar potential than previously.

Korea - being an unending complex of steep hills and sharp-faced ridges -is natural mortar country. Because the Chinese enemy in the night attack endeavors to smother the position at close range and his attacking line is frequently in defilade to our artillery fires by the time the attack is sensed, the mortars are given a wide variety of decisive fire missions.The limiting factor in mortar operation is usually the availability of ammunition rather than a failure at any command level to appreciate what the mortars can do.

Why this is so is readily seen. The battalions, and sometimes separate infantry companies, hold ground in relative detachment from other components of the MLR.

The unit may be 1500-3000 yards from its closest support on right and left and 2000-4000 yards forward of the supporting field artillery. Its position will usually be a hilltop or a ridge crest, if it is in the front line, or a defile covering a stream bed or roadway, if it is “blocking.” The hilltops are a long haul from the nearest supply point; the distance can be covered only by human carriers. Consequently, the 60-mm mortars are carried into the ground somewhat light as to ammunition load. If the 81s are also taken forward, in the average situation their ammunition, too, will be in short supply.

The usual 60-mm position is in a draw on the rearward slope of the friendly hill or at the base of it. On defense, the mortars customarily set up approximate to the CP. In the attack, they seek a position in defilade in a draw or ridge fold somewhere short of the skyline against which the rifle point is advancing. CCF almost never press an attack on the local ground in such way as to make a main impingement on the rear; habitually, they either attack from the front or from the flank via the gentlest slope (particularly if it is covered with tree and underbrush). In consequence, the main threat to the mortars which close with the company is the enemy mortar fire.

But however the unit is armed as to mortars operating from directly within the perimeter or setting up on the heels of the body in the attack, the heavier mortars are generally able to support the action from a distance. This is one of the very genuine fire advantages deriving from the hilliness of Korea and the enemy’s lack of air support and a competent artillery.

Within a few hundred yards to rear of the rifle line, there is always ground where the mortars can set up in defilade, if there is any danger from counter battery.Frequently, the situation is such that the 81s and 4.2s set up boldly in the open, wherever the ground is best for emplacing, and fire away in plain sight of the enemy-heid hill, out of practical range of his bullet-firing weapons.

It is not unusual to see the 81s, 4.2s, 75 recoilless, and sometimes the AA multiple-mount weapons all firing in battery from the same location against one broad target -this in support of the attack during daylight operations. The highly competitive aspects of this combined firing in close juncture tend to develop excessive expenditures.

严寒中的破损

“在朝鲜的步兵战术说明”这份文件已经涵盖了这个课题的很多细节。当气温在0℃ 到32℃之间时，迫击炮操作状态良好，没有什么特别严重的问题：地面仍有充分的弹性能缓冲对底盘的冲击力，升降螺丝杆也没有过度松动或磨损。当气温在-10℃到 -30℃之间时，情况就变得严峻了，如果迫击炮长时间以高速率发射，撞针还有特别是底盘的破损率就会使迫击炮报废。除了陆战一师在长津湖战役中的资料，我们在朝鲜的战斗经验中没有广泛的基本资料以进行这种对比。

长津湖战役是迫击炮长时间（12～14天）在零度以下的环境过度发射的唯一冬季战役。总的来说，各型迫击炮的耐用性在朝鲜冬季战役的过程中经受住了考验。在陆战一师，士兵们并没有抱怨过迫击炮的报废记录；尽管战役结束后，大多数迫击炮不得不整体或部分更换，虽然这一事实提醒我们备用零件的储备是在零度以下开展军事行动的先决条件，将士们依然觉得这并不反映出三种口径迫击炮中的任何一种缺乏耐用性。他们坦承高破损率是严寒条件下的过度发射所造成的，而不是因为武器结构存在什么缺陷。

BREAKAGE IN EXTREME COLD

This subject is covered in some detail in the document, “Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea.”During operations in temperatures ranging between 0℃ and 32℃, the mortars stand up well, and there are no extraordinary problems; the ground is still sufficiently yielding to cushion the shock to the base plates, and there is no undue loosening and wearing of the elevating screws. In temperatures ranging between -10℃ and -30℃, this condition appears to alter radically, and if the mortars are fired for prolonged periods at a high rate, the rate of breakage in firing pins and particularly in base plates becomes disabling to operations. Other than the data from the 1st Marine Division during the Chosen Reservoir operation, there is no broad basis from the Korean experience for the making of this comparison.

This was the only winter campaign wherein the mortars were fired excessively for prolonged periods (12-14 days) under sub-zero conditions. Over-all, the durability of the mortars in all sizes was well attested during the course of Korean winter operations. Troops had no complaint on this score; within the 1st Marine Division; despite the fact that most of the mortars had to be replaced in whole or in part when the operation was completed, the commanders and crews felt that this did not reflect a lack of serviceability in any of the three weapons, though it did warn that a surplus of spare parts was a prerequisite for sub-zero operations. They said frankly that the rate of breakdown was due to excessive firing in extreme cold rather than to any fault in the structure.

4.2英寸迫击炮

这种武器在朝鲜的步兵战斗中像驮马一样任劳任怨。没有任何一种更新式的武器被应用于更广泛的用途或在部队中赢得了更多的宠爱。士兵们众口一词地表达了对它的热爱。4.2英寸迫击炮既精确又耐用；它的一次炮击具有和一发105mm炮弹轰击相当的冲击力；在连续执行任务和显著缓解紧急情况方面，它可能比步兵团中其他任何武器作用都大。一大批营长、团长评论到：他们希望看到步兵团里配备双倍的4.2英寸迫击炮，并觉得由此带来的战斗力增长，在任何地形和气候条件下都绝不会仅仅证明增加这点负担是必要的，（它必然会产生更多的战术价值）。在古土里防御战中广泛使用4.2英寸迫击炮之后，刘易斯 普勒上校作了如下评论：真是完美武器。我们有敏捷而训练有素的迫击炮组，他们让八门迫击炮同时开火，我们发现他们可以在第一枚炮弹爆炸之前向空中打出96发炮弹。

THE 4.2

This weapon is the workhorse of infantry operations in Korea. None of the

other relatively new weapons has been put to more general usage or found greater favor among troops. The enthusiasm for it is unanimous. The 4.2 is accurate and sturdy; the round packs as much wallop as a 105-mm shell; for continuity of performance, and visible impact upon an emergency situation, it is valued perhaps more highly than any other weapon within the infantry regiment. A number of battalion and regimental commanders commented that they would like to see twice as many 4.2s within the infantry regiment, and that they felt that the gain in fighting power, under almost any condition of terrain and climate, would more than justify the added burden. This comment was made by Co1 Lewis Puller, after extensive use of the 4.2 in the defense of Koto-ri: “It is a beautiful weapon. With a fast and well-trained crew and with all eight mortars firing, we found it possible to put 96 rounds in the air before the first one burst.”

81mm迫击炮

在朝鲜战争的历次战役中，这种迫击炮如特洛伊城的卫兵一般守护着我军阵地。在朝鲜的战斗里，它发射的照明弹在有限的补给消耗殆尽之前效果特别良好。因为一般的连级阵地缺乏60mm照明弹的补给，所以81mm照明弹就要执行比在二战时更多的任务。81mm迫击炮照明弹为抵御夜袭的步兵连提供近距离火力支援时，可能比155mm炮弹更加有用，因为后者制造的光圈覆盖的面积太大，为进攻者提供了某些便利。

下面这个典型的战报摘录涉及1951年2月进攻440高地时实施81mm迫击炮火力的情况。这支部队是第27团的重火器连。指挥官弗兰克 L. 迪特里希中尉的记述如下：“我们在2月4日16点45分进入阵地，在那一晚并没有开火。在2月5日4点30分，我收到在我们右翼的第35团遭受敌军进攻的消息。为了支援第35团，我们向高地发射了155发炮弹。我们地图上的数据相当精确，弹着误差不超过100码。天亮以后不久，我们开始射击以支援第3营（第27团的第3营正在从左翼沿着山脉走向进攻440高地）。我们不停地向2800—3000码远的目标射击。在那个白天，我们一共打了500发炮弹，用弹药运送车补给了两次，消耗了可载重1吨拖车载弹量的3/4。其中，57发是白磷弹；两次齐射的效果都很糟；还有七八发臭弹。由于校正机损坏，我们也有几次哑火。在这次战斗中， L连的SCR 300电台出了故障；我们改用营里的有线网络，直到另一部无线电台在那里恢复工作。否则，那将是一次理想的射击——尽善尽美。这个炮兵连里有一门炮参与了朝鲜战争爆发以来所有的战役。”

在这个战例中，81mm迫击炮被用来轰击440高地中央的敌军步兵群，以其火力覆盖沿着山势通向敌军后方的狭窄的石头路。当美军发展攻势时，4.2英寸迫击炮被用来向高地发射烟雾弹。M16半履带式自行高射机枪与81mm迫击炮的发射阵地基本相同，但其活动射角要大得多，可通过修正诸元使其弹着保持在我军先头散兵前约50码。这种高射机枪既可执行4.2英寸迫击炮发射烟雾弹的任务，也可执行81mm迫击炮发射高爆弹的任务

那天的天气完全适合使用烟雾弹。出现了预期的烟云效果，烟雾停留在山脊上很长时间。步兵需要30分钟掩护冲击距离的烟幕，这一措施对于减弱隐藏在440高地岩壁上的中共军队掩体内的机枪火力很有效果。但在所有武器冲出烟幕之前，这些烟幕只掩护了冲击距离的一小半。这位指挥官谈到这个问题“这都是由于缺乏经验。我们在一开始，甚至在我军尖兵进入合适的位置之前，放了太多的烟雾弹。我信任烟雾弹的使用价值，特别是它在进攻中的使用价值。但这次是我来到这个战区以后第一次用迫击炮发射它。因此，我削减了迫击炮弹药的供应量，结果当需要使用它们的时候，弹药就不敷分配了，甚至在必须完成机动的那段时间也是如此。”

THE 81-MM

This mortar has done trojan service throughout the Korean campaign, and its illuminating round was used with particularly good effect during the Korean fighting until the scant supply petered out. It is given relatively more work than during World War II because of the short supply of 60-mm shell in the average company position.For close support of the infantry company withstanding night attack, the 81 mortar illumination is probably better than the 155-mm artillery shell because the circle of light created by the latter often covers too large an area, yielding some advantage to the attacker.

This typical extract covers operation of the 81s during the attack on Hill 440 in February 1951. The unit was Heavy Weapons Company of the 27th Regiment. The description is by Lt Frank L. Dietrich, commanding: “We went into position at 1645 on 4 Feb but we did not fire that night. At 0430 on 5 Feb I got word that the 35th Regiment on our right was under attack. We fired 155 rounds against the Hill in support of the 35th. Our map data was almost exact; it came out within less than 100 yards. Shortly after daylight we began firing in support of the battalion (3rd Battalion of 27th Regiment which was attacking Hill 440 along its length from the left flank). We were firing at’ 2800-3000 yards range. During that day, we fired 500 rounds, resupplying twice with carriers, using 3/4 tons with one-ton trailers. Of this amount, 57 rounds were WP; two salvos were altogether bad; seven or eight other rounds failed. We have also had misfires from breakage of the projector that the charge fits on. During the operation we had one radio failure - the SCR 300 in Love Company; we changed over to the battalion wire net until we got another radio up there. Otherwise, it was perfect fire all the way through - right on the button. There is one barrel in the battery which has served all through the Korean campaign.”

The 81s in this case were employed to fire against the central mass of Hill 440, covering the narrow, stony passages along the heights and leading back to the enemy’s support area. The 4.2s were used to smoke the hill as the American attack developed. The AA quad-50s, firing from approximately the same ground as the 81s traversed over a much wider arc, adjusting so that their fire kept approximately 50 yards ahead of our most forward skirmishers. The artillery was used both to augment the 4.2 in smoking the hill and further the HE missions of the 81s.

The atmospheric conditions were just right for the use of smoke. The first cloud effects were promising; the smoke held fairly well to the ridge crest. The infantry needed about 30 minutes of smoke to cover the distance with relative immunity to the CCF machine guns firing from bunkers tucked away among 440’s rocky ledges. But they had bounded not more than half the distance before all weapons ran out of smoke. The commander said this about it: “It was all due to lack of practice. We laid the smoke on too heavy in the beginning even before we had moved into the right area.I believe in the use of smoke, particularly in the attack. But this was the first time I’ve used it - with mortars - for screening since I’ve been in the Theater. Consequently the mortars had cut down on the amount they carry for our support, and when called on to use it, they couldn’t apportion it, evenly, according to the time required to work out the maneuver.”

建议采取的改进措施：

为改进81mm迫击炮，使其在步兵团中发挥更大的战术校能，多位指挥官提出了如下意见：

尽一切办法减轻重量，以增强其越野机动性；

改进结构，使长炮管可拆解更换为短炮管，这样就可以在保留强大的近程冲击力的同时减轻负重；

分段铸造底盘，使负重均匀分布；

改进升降螺丝杆的冶炼或设计，升降螺丝杆的损坏和迅速磨损现在是这种武器主要的结构缺陷。

SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS

Among the suggestions put forward by various commanders for modifying the 81-mm so as to make it more useful to the infantry regiment there were the following:

 Lighten it in “any manner possible” to increase its cross-country mobility.

Build it so that it could be broken down from a long barrel to a short barrel, thus making a lighter pack possible while preserving its heavy punch at the short ranges.

 Sectionalize the base plate so that the load can be distributed.

Alter metallurgically or in design the elevating screw, the breaking and rapid wearing of which is now the chief structural weakness in the weapon.

60mm迫击炮

60mm迫击炮有几种型号的弹药性能不可靠，这种武器在朝鲜的军事行动中所受的主要批评都是因此而起。1951年1月在临津江畔试射60mm照明弹时，第25步兵师发现这种弹药的35%存在缺陷。这些照明弹能飞出炮管，但不能发光。

11月的会战中，在更寒冷的环境下，陆战1师在古土里和下碣隅里战斗中发射这些照明弹，80%到90%的炮弹照明效果都很糟。

60mm白磷弹的表现也劣迹斑斑。在报告中，60mm白磷弹比81mm白磷弹出的故障要多。在冬季的军事行动中，即使保守地说，每5发60mm白磷弹中也至少有1发臭弹。

THE 60-MM

The unreliability of 60-mm ammunition in several types is the cause of chief criticism of the weapon in Korean operations.

In test firing of the 60 illuminating shell along the Imjin River in January 1951, the 25th Infantry Division found that the ammunition was approximately 35 percent defective. The round would leave the tube but would not produce a light.

Firing in combat, under more extreme cold, the 1st Marine Division at Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri got 80 to 90 percent negative results with the same round in the November battle.

The WP round has also performed spottily; more failures are reported with the 60 than with the 81 WP. It is conservative to say that during winter operations at least one in every five WP 60-mm rounds failed.