主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年） -- 徐荣

手榴弹

主要武器之一

格兰特的部队在维克斯堡战役中偶然发现了手榴弹的价值，与之相似，由于朝鲜的地势，敌军对手榴弹的使用也要求我们用这种武器回敬他们，朝鲜的战斗中手榴弹的重要性在不断增长。几乎毫无例外，所有在朝鲜的战斗中都有手榴弹的使用。与消耗的手榴弹数目相比，美军在朝鲜使用手榴弹的方式与一战或二战中的使用方式别无二致，（毫无进步）。

因此，我军在训练方面准备不足。在早些时候，对手榴弹和枪榴弹的评价都偏低；极少有投弹专家准备好了去训练他人；在班里，士兵们不知道怎么组织一个投弹组，系统地进行战地投弹；对手榴弹的供给缺乏或根本没有管理，这导致了巨大的浪费。通过从实战检验和失误中学到的经验教训，上述局面已经逐渐改善。

总之，手榴弹是当前战斗中的主要武器之一，但是我军的训练却从没有预料到这样的情势。不幸的是，从差不多自1918年以来这种武器的训练记录来看，我军练习投弹时几乎把全部精力都用于准备堑壕袭击战和清除障碍物，（而忽略了其他方面）。“既然一个普通美国人都知道怎么扔石头，那么把大量精力投入到手榴弹技术上只是浪费训练时间”，近年来，受到这种理论或多或少的影响，我们继续沿着老路走下去，（缺乏创新）。

因此，虽然49% 的美国士兵有良好的臂力可用于投掷，我们的投弹战术却在很大程度上只能算是普普通通，尽管到处都有偶尔的出色表现。

在高低起伏的山地国家，投弹的实际效果与对付一个堑壕体系或加强的灌木篱墙没什么不同。在这种地形下，敌方存在射击盲区，这个区域可以为爆破手提供保护。一个膂力强劲的投弹手可以肃清前方20—35码远的所有地域。当他抬起身体投掷手榴弹的时候，他所在小组的同伴可为他提供掩护。他能通过接力传送的方式得到补给。在手榴弹爆炸的掩护下，这个小组可趁机跃进。这个程序并不复杂，但必须组织好人员去实现它，它成功与否与关键人员的选择联系紧密。在白天进攻顺着山脊延伸的堑壕阵地时，在战术上除了接近敌军防线上最近的缺口之外没什么别的东西。即使这样，我军步兵在山顶的战斗中仍然没有广泛应用这种方法，因为他们中没有人被教授过。仅仅在偶尔的情况下，某个有灵感的下级军官或某个行动坚决的班凭经验实施了这种战术并发现它的确有效。

在夜间防御中，有效使用手榴弹本来可以在对付中共军队的早期战役中给美军以极大的利益。中国人把自己当成了掷弹兵；他们也幻想：美军被这种武器吓破了胆，手榴弹能严重挫伤美军的士气（这是从十一月的会战中缴获的中共军队秘密文件得知的，这份文件是关于在进攻中的武器使用的，它绝对地陈述了那些看法。敌人的战术完全遵循这些教条也证实了这一点）。但是正如在早先的战斗中一次次地证明的那样，敌人的这两条都错了。中共士兵作为投手臂力孱弱，在身体上并不适合攻击性地使用这种武器。我军士兵曾轻蔑地划线标记中国人的（轻木柄型）手榴弹的投掷距离。

敌人的这些战术选择，再加上他们缺乏执行它们的天赋，本来可以在随之而来的依靠臂力交锋的战斗中给与我们一项宝贵的优势。要是我军士兵曾准备过这种战斗，为此进行过训练， 了解开始和发展战斗时如何补给，（他们就能够取得这种优势）。然而实际情况却不是这样。的确，对于任何一种武器，如果只对它进行一般地、肤浅地而不是坚强有力、富有想象力的训练，士兵们就会低估它潜在的战斗价值，忽视“未与敌军接触时应节约弹药”的原则，而且，在战斗开始后不能迅速领会如何根据形势使用武器。除非战士们特别接受过投弹教学，他们便不能以投弹手的思维考虑问题。迄今为止在约30年的时间里，陆军低估了系统地进行投弹训练的价值和在每个步兵连里配备数名投弹专家的极度必要性。在朝鲜，我们不得不为这项疏忽付出代价。

当我军与中共军队交战时，他们从未准备好在近距离内换用不同武器。枪榴弹发射器早早被丢弃。在行进间，士兵们粗心大意地投光了手榴弹。需要在该地重新使用手榴弹时，再教导该连“节约弹药以便发现合适目标时能及时投掷，而不要在空旷地上炸出一声巨响。”已经太迟，不能保证在夜间防御中自始至终都能有效地使用手榴弹了。如何使手榴弹和子弹形成合成火力，士兵们知道得很少或根本不知道。给臂力强劲和活跃的投手分配较多的手榴弹，可能会对该连取得最好的结果有利，但我们没有发现这种情况。所有对手榴弹的使用都是不协调的、随意的。

未接受过投弹训练的下级军官在夜战中不能认清战术形势，不能根据形势下达使用照明枪榴弹、手榴弹和近距离杀伤弹的命令。因此，他们也就没有急迫地要求上级提供这些弹药。等到士兵们开始了解到这些可能使用的战术手段并临时准备使自己的投弹发挥更大的效力的方法时，数周时间已经过去了。

从朝鲜战役中得到的主要教训之一是：陆军应当恢复投弹教学，并以和一战时差不多的方式促进士兵在服役期间系统地、明智地掌握这种武器。

GRENADES

ONE OF THE MAIN WEAPONS

As happened with Grant’s troops in the Vicksburg campaign, the hand grenade has become of ever-increasing importance in the Korean fighting because the ground and the enemy’s use of it necessitated a return to this weapon. Practically without exception, all in-fighting in Korea is attended by hand-grenade action. In comparison to the numbers engaged, use of the hand grenade by American troops in Korea is manifold what it was in either World War I or II.

For this our forces were ill-prepared in point of training; in the early stages, appreciation of the usefulness of the grenade (both hand and rifle) was at a low ebb; there were few specialists at hand who were prepared to coach others; within the squad, men did not know how to organize as a grenade team for the systematic bombing-out of ground; there was little or no control over grenade supply, which resulted in large wastage. That the situation has gradually improved is due to what has been learned through combat trial and error.

In sum, the grenade is one of the main weapons of the fighting, but training had never anticipated any such condition, Unfortunately, that has been pretty much the training history of this weapon since 1918, when grenade practice, in anticipation of trench-raid operation and the clearing of traverses, was rather thorough. In more recent years, we have proceeded more or less according to the theory that since an average American knows how to throw a rock, it is a waste of training time to devote any large amount of attention to grenade technique.

In consequence, though approximately 49 percent of American troops have good throwing arms, our grenade tactics are for the most part mediocre, with just here and there an occasional brilliant performance.

In its practical effects, grenading in uneven hill country is not unlike going against a trench system or a fortified hedgerow. There is dead space which can be used for the bomber’s protection. One strong-armed thrower can clean out, all ground 20-35 yards to his fore. Part of his team can cover him when he rises to throw. He can be kept supplied by relay. Under cover of the explosion, the group can bound ahead. There is nothing complex about this procedure; but men do have to be organized for it, and its success usually hinges around the selection of the key man. In daylight attack against dug-in positions along the ridge crests, there isn’t anything else in tactics which is more likely to close the last gap. Even so, there is no general application of this method by our infantry in the hilltop fighting because none has been taught. Only now and then an inspired junior leader or a determined squad empirically puts it into effect and discovers that it works.

In night defense, efficient use of the hand (and rifle) grenade would have given American forces a heavy advantage in the early stages of the campaign against CCF. The Chinese fancy themselves to be grenadiers; also, they were suffering from the illusion that American troops were unduly fearful of this weapon and that it had an extremely demoralizing effect upon them, (This is known because of the capture, during the November battle, of a secret, CCF paper on weapons usage in the attack which categorically stated these propositions, and because the tactics pursued followed this instruction absolutely.) But the enemy was mistaken on both counts, as was proved time and again in the early fighting. The CCF were not physically suited to aggressive use of this weapon, being weak-armed throwers. Our troops had toward the Chinese grenade (light potato-masher type) a scorn bordering on contempt.

The enemy’s election of these tactics, combined with his lack of natural aptitude for them, would have given us a priceless advantage in the arm’s length fighting which followed, had our men been prepared by training and the state of their supply to recognize the opening and exploit it. Such was not, the case. It is true of any weapon that when training is generally of superficial character, instead of being vigorous and imaginative, troops will put a low estimate on the probable fighting value of the weapon, be careless of its conservation when not in contact with the enemy, and, after the fighting starts, will be slow to see how use of the weapon should be applied to the situation. Men in battle cannot think as grenadiers unless they have been specially schooled as grenadiers. For almost 30 years now the Army has discounted the value of systematic grenade training and the pre-eminent worth of having a few grenade specialists in each infantry company. The price for this neglect has been exacted in Korea.

When our forces began to engage CCF, they were in no wise prepared for the exchange at short range. Rifle-grenade launchers had been thrown away. The troops had carelessly disposed of their hand grenades during the advance. When re-issue was effected on the spot, it was too late to school the company in the efficient use of the grenade in night defense toward the end that the weapon could be conserved for timely use against suitable targets instead of exploded to make noise over relatively empty terrain. The troops knew little or nothing about how to use grenade fire and bullet fire in combination. It was not seen that for the good of the company the best results would ensue if a larger share of grenades were given to the strong-armed and active throwers. All that was done with respect to employment of this weapon was uncoordinated and haphazard.

Not, having been grenade-trained, junior leaders did not recognize that the tactica1 situation in the night fight was made to order for the illuminating rifle grenade, the hand grenade, and close-range fragmentation bombing of the revealed targets. In consequence they did not press upon higher command any demands for these materials. Weeks passed before men within the squads began to recognize these possibilities and to improvise methods which would give greater effectiveness to their own grenading.

One of the main lessons of the Korean campaign is that the grenade school should be restored by the Army and used in about, the same way as during World War I to promote systematic and intelligent understanding of the weapon throughout the service.

寒冷天气时的操作

在零度以下的战斗中，手榴弹对使用者自身是个非常严重的威胁。因为寒冷，手榴弹的栓销很难拔开，因此在投弹前必须脱下手套。只要握住这些冰冷的金属几秒钟，手指就会冻僵。尽管使用者的握持时间只足以使栓销松动并将手榴弹投出，在多个步兵连中仍因此产生了冻伤。此外，在冬季战斗中，放在开在散兵坑侧面的泥搁架上的手榴弹，很快会从半冻结的地面上吸收潮气因而失效。很多连级军官得出这样一个结论: 由于上述原因，目前的这些手榴弹在零下20℃或更低气温下是无用的。

COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

In sub-zero operations the hand grenade is a source of deadly danger to the user. The pin is hard to extract because of the cold; therefore the mitten must be removed prior to throwing. The cold metal, held in the hand for only a few seconds, will freeze the fingers. Infantry companies took frostbite losses from this cause even though the users held the bomb only long enough to work the pin loose and get the grenade away. Furthermore, in the winter fighting, grenades placed on a dirt shelf cut into the side of the foxhole soon absorbed moisture from the half-frozen ground and became inoperative. Many company officers reached the conclusion that for these reasons the present grenade is useless during in-fighting in temperatures running -20 and lower.

总体效能

在进行夜间环形防御时，不可能去评估美军投弹对敌军行动的影响有多大。询问参战人员的结果只表明：在一般性的射击中使用了过多的手榴弹，结果当活动目标在近距离出现的危急关头来临时手榴弹就不足了。在近距离战斗中敌军战斗群被我军集中使用的手榴弹明确阻止或摧毁的战例很少，在非常适宜使用手榴弹的情况下发挥领导才能指导士兵们协同使用这种武器的战例则更加罕见。

在朝鲜，手榴弹并不像在二战时那样广泛地用于扫荡残敌。除了因为敌军的山顶掩体经常在投弹手接近它之前就已被我军的平射武器摧毁，还因为敌军严重缺乏重装备。然而，当步兵别无他法只能依靠直接攻击夺取阵地时，投进敌军掩体枪眼的那些手榴弹的轰鸣通常才是致命一击。

没有使用枪榴弹的战例。在这项分析涉及的所有军事行动中，我军都没有使用过这种武器，只有我们的敌人中共军队使用过它。在山顶的战斗中，枪榴弹可能会非常有效，交战双方的距离与它的射程正好匹配。可是，我军士兵早早就丢弃了枪榴弹发射器。

在朝鲜的战斗中，除了严寒中的军事行动，发给部队的爆破型手榴弹大体能够满足战术需要。

更有经验的士兵们评论道：不管在何种情况下，带锯齿的改进过的蛋形手榴弹在攻防作战中更加实用，只要让一个一般臂力的投手攻击性地使用它就可以了。这个人可以是玩过棒球的或者在高中以后有打橄榄球的相当经验的士兵。一个连队里总有这样的人。他们可以很自然地使用这种武器，而且更有可能击中目标。

在我们所研究的连级战斗中，都使用了手榴弹，还没有出现美军因己方手榴弹火力伤亡的实例，不论是因为手榴弹过早爆炸还是因为距弹着区太近。

除严寒天气以外的战斗中，我军手榴弹的哑弹率如此之低令人觉得有些不可思议；而在另一方面，数据显示20%至30%的中共军队的手榴弹因为机械故障或操作不当未能爆炸。

GENERAL UTILITY

Under the conditions of the night perimeter defense, it is impossible to make any estimate of the effectiveness of American grenading upon enemy action. Interrogation shows only that perhaps an excessive percentage of grenade is used in genera1 fire, resulting in subsequent shortages during the crisis when there are live targets within close range. There are very few clean-cut examples of an enemy group being stopped or destroyed by concentrated use of the grenade during close action, and even fewer examples of leadership directing coordinated use of the weapon in situations well suited to it.

The grenade is not used as extensively for mop-up purposes in Korea as during World War II operations because of the enemy’s general lack of heavy installations, other than the hilltop bunkers, which are usually knocked out by flat-trajectory weapons before the grenadiers can close in. However, when the infantry has no recourse but to take the position by direct assault, the sing of a few grenades through the embrasures is the accustomed coup de grace.

There are no examples of the use of rifle grenades. The weapon was not used during any of the operations included in the analysis, except by the CCF enemy. Rifle grenades could have proved useful in the hilltop fighting; the distance between the engaging sides was usually such that its range was appropriate. But the launchers had been thrown away.

Except for operations in extreme cold, the issue explosive-type grenade is generally satisfactory to the tactical need in the Korean fighting.

The more experienced troops comment, however, that the serrated, modified Mills bomb is more practical for both offensive and defensive uses, so long as it is employed offensively by an average strong-armed thrower. This would include individuals who have played baseball or have had considerable experience with passing the football in their high school years or later. There are always such men in a company. They can use the weapon in a natural way and they are more likely to get it on the target.

In the company actions taken under study, all of which made some use of the hand grenade, there is no instance of an American casualty resulting from our own grenade fire, either in consequence of a premature explosion or from being too close to the impact area.

The percentage of dud grenades is so small as to be inconsequential except in extreme cold weather; on the other hand, the figures indicate that somewhere between 20 and 30 percent of CCF grenades do not fire because of defects either in the mechanism or in the handling.