主题：【原创】美国防部报告关于三峡部分的中文译文 -- 渡泸

这份报告的标题是"向国会提交的2004年中国人民解放军军事力量报告", 关于三峡的字句在这份报告的最后一部分，第五部分的第四段：“台湾对解放军的反制能力”。这一段又分为六点。

该报告可以在这里下载:

http://www.defenselink.mil/advisories/2004/pa20040529-0422.html

第一点：对中国大陆的打击能力

最近，台北的政治和军事领导人表达了获得武器的意愿，这些武器需要具有对大陆的对等打击能力，并将这种能力作为一种成本效益比比较高的威慑。台湾空军已经拥有潜在的对中国的打击能力。（台湾）领导人已经公开宣称他们需要弹道导弹和对地攻击巡航导弹。

因为台北在部署防御系统上的能力无法与北京相比，所以那些支持对大陆实施打击的人显然希望至少能显示（台湾）对中国的城市人口或者重要目标拥有可靠威胁手段，这些目标包括三峡大坝，同时希望这些威胁手段能够对中国的军事压力产生威慑作用。

以下为该报告第五部分的英文原文：

Taiwan’s Strengths in Countering PLA Courses of Action

Asymmetric capabilities that Taiwan possesses or is acquiring could deter a Chinese

attack by making it unacceptably costly. Taiwan most likely will expand these

capabilities either in tandem with or in lieu of improving its conventional forces.

Strike Capabilities Against the Mainland

Taipei political and military leaders have recently suggested acquiring weapon systems

capable of standoff strikes against the Chinese mainland as a cost-effective means of

deterrence. Taiwan’s Air Force already has a latent capability for airstrikes against

China. Leaders have publicly cited the need for ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles.

Since Taipei cannot match Beijing’s ability to field offensive systems, proponents of

strikes against the mainland apparently hope that merely presenting credible threats to

China’s urban population or high- value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter

Chinese military coercion.

Diplomatic Support

President Chen’s administration has sought to elicit international sympathy for Taiwan’s

plight in the face of China’s growing ballistic missile force, for which the island has no

adequate countermeasures. A diplomatic initiative begun late in 2002 sought to draw

international attention to the growing cross-Strait missile imbalance. A resolution

demanding that China withdraw its missiles from the Taiwan Strait area was initially

selected as the topic for the island’s first popular referendum. Taipei probably hopes

these efforts will deter such an attack by increasing the prospect for diplomatic

consequences.

Computer Network Attack

Taiwan’s limited ability to attack Chinese military bases has prompted some Taiwan

authors to endorse attacking China’s command and control systems to achieve

information superiority. Specific targets would include Chinese airports, command and

control centers, and communication nodes. Taiwan has significant potential in this area,

thanks to the island’s high information technology level and the military’s ability to

conscript personnel from a tech-savvy population.

Psychological Warfare

The Taiwan military’s principal psychological warfare (PSYWAR) organization is the

General Political Warfare Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (MND).

Subordinate units conducting strategic psychological operations include the 1st

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group, three Army PSYOP companies responsible

for publishing and propaganda, and the Political Warfare College, which trains PSYWAR

cadre.

The Army PSYWAR Preparedness Center was set up in January 2002. This center will

carry out future PSYOP missions with the armed forces' first wholly dedicated PSYWAR

units, integrated with combat intelligence. If the PSYWAR Preparedness Center

succeeds, a special command organization will be set up in the MND. Army, Navy, and

Air Force PSYOP units probably will be organized in the future.

Electronic Warfare

EW is a top Taiwan military priority because of concerns about China’s own developing

EW capabilities. During the island’s HANKUANG-19 exercise in 2003, tactical EW

units exercised jamming against command and control networks and intelligence

collection systems supporting enemy amphibious landings. Taiwan’s MND

Communications Development Office also reportedly has a strategic EW capability.

Taiwan has more than 30 other ground electronic reconnaissance stations and

communications intelligence stations.

Information Operations

Taiwan’s MND has identified information warfare as a key area for modernization. The

military intends that information operations, along with command and control systems,

will survive an initial PLA assault. Taiwan’s ongoing “Posheng” C4ISR modernization

project includes electronic countermeasure and electronic counter-countermeasure

enhancements. These efforts aim to ensure Taiwan’s C4ISR survives kinetic and

nonkinetic attacks, such as cyberwarfare. In the past 2 years, training exercises worked

to set a firm foundation for information operations capabilities.