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主题：【原创】乱侃怪物Google的股价估价: 市值观点 -- 四月一日
家园 【原创】乱侃怪物Google的股价估价: 市值观点 自从网络泡泡起, 五花八门的股票估价模型可是多了去了. 比如说营收 / 市值比之类的, 说起来是有点道理, 但是细想下去又似乎不大对头. 这个模型主要是以市场控制力为基础, 将营收作为市场影响力的基数, 再对比到 "合理市值" 以至于 "合理股价" 的. 对于某些产业是有些意思, 但推而广之就嫌粗糙了. 特别是对于竞价式竞争的市场, 透过低价倾销增加营收的竞争方式使得营收愈大反而代表了这个公司失血更多, 股价应该更低才是. 但就相当于陇断式竞争的产业来说, 营收高确实可以代表市场的掌握度, 有利于推动下一波的竞争策略.
现在来看看怪物Google的股价. (till to 3-Feb-2005)
From: http://finance.yahoo.com/q/bc?s=GOOG&t=6m
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改----------------------------------------
Last Trade: 210.86
Trade Time: Feb 3
Change: 4.90 (2.38%)
Prev Close: 205.96
Open: 205.99
Bid: 0.01 x 100
Ask: 9,000.00 x 100
1y Target Est: 179.80
Day's Range: 205.81 - 213.37
52wk Range: 95.96 - 216.80
Volume: 13,005,885
Avg Vol (3m): 10,834,818
Market Cap: 57.65B
P/E (ttm): 146.23
EPS (ttm): 1.44
Div & Yield: N/A (N/A)
----------------------------------------
以Google的获利能力1.44来说, 高达210.86的股价算下来的P/E是146.23. 以同时期的Yahoo和Microsoft相比, Google的P/E显然是高过头了.
公司 股价 市值 获利 P/E
GOOG 210.86 57.65B 1.44 146.23
YHOO 35.18 48.37B 0.58 61.08
MSFT 26.18 284.62B 0.92 28.55
Microsoft与Google的性质差得多, 但在某些方面Yahoo和Google的差异就比较接近了. 前面提过的 "营收 / 市值比" 用作评估公司的 "市场掌握能力" 来看, 虽然入口网站与搜寻引擎的市场掌握度都并非反映在营收上的, 但这个概念是评估这类公司股价最好的方式. 作为搜寻引擎龙头的Google, 大可透过其无人能比的被使用度, 作为后续新服务商品的基础平台, 甚至像M$用受人争议的方式强迫推销IE一样. 以资源的角度来看, Google现在便拥有一个无人能比的优势: 已被接受且广泛使用的平台. 这个平台当然可以看成是项资产, 而且价值不低. 至于未来在这个既有优势下Google还能发挥到什么程度, 现在大概只有上帝才知道.
对于Google, 比较令人讶异的应该是它的总市值高于Yahoo, 这个也是推估Google股价合理性的重要因素. 相对上Yahoo的发展比Google成熟, 也就是Yahoo未来的爆发成长可能性比Google来得低. 以M$, Yahoo, Google三家的P/E来看, M$ 的28.55最低, Yahoo的61.23次之, Google的146.23当然是最高的. 这个排序是合理的, 但是数值就有疑虑了.
回头说P/E吧. 这个估价法对已经相当成熟, 获利能力相当稳定的传统产业较为有效. 换句话说, 买大公司的股票就相当于买长期债券, 如IBM之类的, P/E也在18.89的合理范围内. 但对新公司来说, 尚位于成长阶段, 所以P/E一般是高些的. 再者Google所处的产业是成长性产业, 所以成长性产业中的成长性公司, 人们对网络的幻想加上对Google的幻想, 造就了怪物级的Google.
那么, 针对这类型公司, 该怎么面对会比较合理呢? 所谓的市场是由供需双方构成的, 如果需求面强劲, 价格高也不奇怪. 对于股市, 需求面是由一般投资人, 投资组织以及可能的并购主所构成, 其中最值得注意的便是 "可能的并购主" 这项. 对于一般投资人与投资组织两者来说, 获得股息是主要的获利来源 (不算买卖套利的话), 这也是P/E估价法的主要依据. 然则, 对于以服务为主体的网络公司而言, 其产品是无形的服务, 平台与服务的接受度与使用度所构成的市场影响力为其主要资产. 即使Google赚不了太多钱, 但其价值仍然可以透过被并购提高, 如果有能用得上他的平台来获利的公司的话.
用总市值的观点来看网络服务公司, 应该比P/E来得贴近事实, 毕竟这是个新的产业型态, 只套用过去模式不一定就能充份解释. 今天不论Google是不是已经大涨了, 就说个总市值吧, Google超越Amazon.com是必然的, 低于Microsoft也是必然的, 落点是在Yahoo上下没错, 而且有可能比Yahoo略高, 因为Yahoo的主要地盘入口网站的多样性太高, 市场覆盖率及掌握度不及Google, 何况Google已经开始介入如E-mail之类的事业了, 一脚踏进Yahoo的地头. 两相竞争之下, 加上MSN在一旁虎视眈眈, Yahoo的前景不见得就比Google光明. 在此基础上评估, Google反映在总市值上的公司价值比Yahoo高也不为过. 现在或许不及, 但二三年内便有可能换过. Google该比Yahoo有价值吗? 或者是两个都被高估了? Google的潜在获利能力如何? 这个或许只有时间能证明.
嗯, 这是乱侃, 试图以 "公司价值" 的观点解释股价总市值 (总市值才是供需交易的结果) 再反推回股价, 作为网络服务业的估价模式, 替代传统以获利观点为基础的P/E估价法. 不过, 如果问我现在Google值不值得买? 我的答案是: 呵呵.
元宝推荐：Chieftain,家园 总体经济情况不好，任何个股的分析都没有什么意义。 现在里2000年可不远啊，记性
怎么这么差
家园 今日美国人还在犯这个毛病 不过，人家不犯错，怎么有俺们的机会呢？错的越离谱越疯狂，调整的空间就越大么！
家园 不要急，做空的一定要有耐性 老兄有没有看Barron's最新一期有关homebuilder off-the-balance sheet financing? 里面提了几个具体的做空目标。
家园 急倒是不急 但是精确判断大市和个股的逆转，还是很难的。所以选择购入长期认沽权，更重要的是分期建仓，以免踏空。CFC前几日，一天内在strike $30 put爆量成交10000手，相当于20万股，而平常才几十手而已，所以看来盯着看的人不是一个两个。尽管GM上涨，长期put的价格却跌不下去，所以买入也没有太大的风险，反而都涨了一点。俺是肯定不会直接卖空本股的，所以短期逼空对俺来说不起作用。之所以还没有SHORT百度，是因为它没有长期的PUT可以买，最远的才到明年3月份。
Barron's 的文章倒是没有看，有没有电子版可以分享？
- 复 急倒是不急
家园 这里看过来 Housing's Hidden Headache
By JACQUELINE DOHERTY
HOME BUILDERS HAVE THRIVED IN THE PAST five years as easy money fueled enormous demand for houses -- as well as abundant supply. The role of low interest rates and novel loan structures in helping buyers enter the market -- or trade up to McMansions -- has been well-documented. Less understood is the potentially problematic financing that has enabled developers to increase their supply of land to meet, and perhaps exceed, this unprecedented demand.
Unlike in past housing cycles, when they borrowed heavily from banks, home builders today also use options and off-balance-sheet joint ventures to buy land. When times were flush, these financing vehicles enabled the industry to expand without bulking up its debt. But now that the housing market has weakened, land options and joint ventures could come back to haunt some companies, their financial partners and the broader economy -- not to mention stockholders.
The pain could be twofold: If orders dry up and home builders are forced to write off their option deposits or joint-venture investments, which are considered assets, some could face substantial hits to book value. Alternately, builders' earnings could be nicked if joint-venture gains turn to losses.
Housing bulls argue that concerns about the deteriorating health of the residential real-estate market largely are reflected in building-company shares. After all, the Standard & Poor's Supercomposite Homebuilding Index is down 41% from its high of July 2005. If the housing recession proves mild and short-lived, the stocks could rally, much as Barron's argued in a cover story in late August ("Big Ripple," Aug. 28, 2006). So far, that's been a savvy call: Most are up almost 20% from their lows this past July.
If the downturn is severe and protracted, however, as it may be in locales where home prices and speculative development have soared, the industry's use of options and joint ventures is likely to prolong the pain. "The home builders are going to abandon a significant amount of their options and attempt to dissolve the joint ventures that no longer meet their return requirements," Ivy Zelman, an analyst at Credit Suisse, predicts.
Most housing companies today trade at slight premiums to book value, which is considered a more reliable indicator of their worth than price-earnings multiples. And any impairment to book (roughly defined as assets minus liabilities) could result in similar markdowns in the companies' shares.
FOR SOME COMPANIES, the problems of Technical Olympic USA (ticker: TOA) may be a sober warning. Last week the U.S. unit of the Greek construction company announced that, because of softness in the Florida real-estate market, the revised sales and delivery projections of one of its residential joint ventures won't be adequate to support the JV's capital structure. The company is requesting waivers from its lenders regarding potential defaults, among other things.
The JV was created in August 2005 to buy the assets of Transeastern Properties of Coral Springs, Fla., and was financed aggressively, with equity equal to only 20% of the purchase price, versus the 40% common in most JV deals. News of its problems sent Technical Olympic's shares down about 15% on the week, to 9.83, though it had been trading below book value before the disclosures.
The company's senior and junior debt fell to levels implying its equity in the JV and loans and advances to the JV, which total $141 million, could be wiped out. The company, which has said it does not intend to contribute additional capital to the venture, declined to comment. But Technical Olympic's parent acknowledged in a press release that in a "worst-case scenario," its sub would take an after-tax charge of $89 million, or $1.50 a share. It estimates book value will decline 4% from the June quarter.
"This won't be the only company that will affected," says Alex Barron, a senior housing analyst at JMP Securities in San Francisco. "All the other home builders will have writedowns of joint ventures, option deposits and land on their balance sheets."
BULLISH INDUSTRY ANALYSTS BELIEVE concerns about option-deposit and joint-venture writedowns are overblown.
But that might not be true for some companies with large exposure. At NVR (NVR), a Reston, Va., builder, $642 million of option deposits account for as much as 64% of book value. With the shares trading at 553 apiece, or 3.2 times book, investors appear to have given little consideration to the possibility of writedowns. The company declined to comment.
Hovnanian Enterprises (HOV) and Beazer Homes USA (BZH) also could be vulnerable; their options deposits each equal at least 20% of book. Other companies, such as MDC Holdings (MDC) and D.R. Horton (DHI) have little exposure.
- 复 这里看过来
家园 触目惊心 这些公司，现金都很少，债务都很大；虽然把inventory放在current assets，但是谁都知道，那些房子/地作为库存在目前的市场情况下不大降价是不可能很快出售的，要知道美国待售房屋量已经是历史新高，够卖上7个半月的。加上利率高企，这些开发商那个日子确实很难过啊！
说句实话，这些公司都够得上高危的，美中不足的是现在的价位也不高，不少股价已经低于净资产，当然这也是合理的，毕竟off balance financing的后果要考虑。如果想再挑剔一点，对做空的对象，Perfect kill是在股票虚高之"极"的时候，痛下杀手。环顾今日之股市，对象还是不少的
之所以觉得CFC比较欠扁，是因为它股价正好趁房市大热的几年，扶摇直上，主要的业务是房屋贷款，而且问题贷款一定不少！而今股价仍然高企，从高位没有回调多少，公司的管理似乎也问题多多，股市和本身双重下跌的压力，有可能让股价在一年内跌到15甚至10美金以下。
GM毫无实质利好消息，福特也承认无计可施，都在破产边缘，而且今后两三年内想扭转颓势，实在是不容易，而GM却一直升到33美元以上，这也是找扁啊。
- 复 这里看过来
家园 继续 "We've used land options for decades. We think they are a very efficient use of capital," says J. Larry Sorsby, CFO of Hovnanian, in Red Bank, N.J.
Beazer, based in Atlanta, didn't return Barron's calls.
Some home builders already have walked away from land deals and taken modest losses. Miami-based Lennar (LEN) last week reported it wrote off $15.8 million in option deposits and related costs and made a "$16.5 million valuation adjustment" to the company's joint ventures, which contributed to a $5.9 million joint-venture loss in the third quarter, versus a gain of $16.8 million a year ago. Total profits in the latest quarter, ended August, fell to $206.7 million from $337.3 million a year earlier.
By using land options and development joint ventures, Lennar doesn't have to take on 100% of the risk of a project, explains Bruce Gross, the company's CFO. It also can team up with strategic partners to enter new markets or to buy large parcels of land. Many JVs were created years ago and have significant pent-up value, he adds.
Among the country's major home builders, Lennar has the largest exposure to joint ventures; $1.45 billion of equity in these ventures represents about 25% of the company's book value. That's in addition to $1.3 billion of option deposits and lines of credit outstanding, equal to an additional 23% of book.
At Standard Pacific (SPF), an Irvine, Calif.-based builder, equity in joint ventures amounts to 18% of book value. At KB Home (KBH), in Los Angeles, it represents 13% of book, and at Hovnanian, 11%.
Other companies, including MDC Holdings and D.R. Horton, have no joint-venture exposure. Standard Pacific and D.R. Horton didn't return calls. MDC and KB Home declined to comment.
While all option deals are structured differently, their intent is the same: A home builder that wants to buy land for future use but doesn't want to put the property -- or the debt needed to purchase it -- on the balance sheet, buys an option to purchase the land from its owner at a set price over an agreed-upon period.
When the land is owned by a farmer, industry experts say, the option might cost 5% of its full, agreed-upon value. When an investor group, known in the industry as a land bank, owns the property, terms typically have been much steeper, with deposits ranging from 10% to 20%. In addition, a builder subsequently might make monthly payments of 15% to 20% of the value of the land, minus the deposit -- well above the 6.5% to 9% it would cost to borrow funds in the capital markets.
Some of the largest land bankers include IHP Capital Partners, Acacia Capital and Hearthstone. Hedge funds such as Stark Investments and Farallon Capital Management reportedly have jumped into the business, as well; both declined to comment. "I've seen a lot more hedge-fund involvement over the last five years," says Dale Goldsmith, a lawyer with Armbruster & Goldsmith, a Los Angeles firm specializing in land use and entitlements.
In turning to land bankers, are home builders really using "financing that's hidden?" asks Joseph Snider, a senior credit officer at Moody's Investors Service. Moody's now rates the home builders based on numbers adjusted for option and joint-venture liabilities. While it has yet to change any debt ratings, Snider warned in a recent report that companies with significant use of options and joint ventures should increase disclosure of their terms and related liabilities or face the risk that these deals will put downward pressure on their ratings relative to companies with less complex structures.
In recent years, land options have worked wonderfully. Most have a duration of three to five years, and those acquired before 2003 are money good if exercised this year, given the enormous appreciation in land values. Writeoffs have been small to date; Zelman of Credit Suisse estimates that the home builders have written off nearly $300 million in option deposits through this year's second quarter, a small fraction of industry earnings.
The numbers could grow, however, if the price of land tanks, along with housing prices. Home builders don't disclose when their options were struck. Nor do they reveal the economics of options and joint ventures, Moody's notwithstanding. At most, companies say they review their option and joint-venture investments each quarter, writing down deals as necessary.
IF HOME BUILDERS WALK AWAY FROM LAND OPTIONS, the impact is likely to be widespread. The land owner presumably would shop the property anew, and at a reduced price, particularly if it has associated debt.
Jeff Barcy, CEO of Hearthstone, a San Francisco-based land banker with access to $4 billion of equity capital, cites a deal in which a publicly traded home builder recently walked away from an option to buy land in Florida for $60 million. The parcel recently was resold for $32 million. (For more on Florida's real-estate woes, see "The Perfect Storm.")
- 复 继续
家园 最后- 字数限制太麻烦 The Florida deal "definitely put pressure on the broader market, and affects all the deals" in that market, Barcy says. "Everything is connected in a local market. We're seeing more weakness across the U.S. on a daily basis."
A number of home builders have said they're working to renegotiate the terms of some of their land options, in the hope of reducing purchase prices or extending the time periods in which they agreed to exercise them. If they don't reach acceptable terms, some indicate they'll walk.
Hovnanian Enterprises, which has $454 million of option deposits and letters of credit outstanding, wrote off $11.4 million of deposits in its fiscal third quarter, ended July, and expects to walk away from additional options, says CFO Sorsby.
Management told analysts it couldn't quantify the exact impact of option renegotiations until such talks conclude. Therefore, its earnings guidance for its fiscal fourth quarter ranges widely, from $1.05 a share to $1.80. Hovnanian's stock has been among the industry's strongest performers of late, up about 20%, to 30, since Aug. 14. Still, it's down more than 50% from its highs in 2005.
If home builders forfeit their option deposits, they could face additional costs. Among other things, they might have to spread the sunk costs of developing a community -- which range from architectural plans to the construction of model homes and swimming pools -- over fewer homes, one land banker explains.
There's also reputation risk. "Companies with 50 homes built don't want to walk away from [unfinished] communities. It would kill their reputations," says John Burns, president of John Burns Real Estate Consulting in Irvine, Calif.
Joint ventures, too, have allowed home builders to buy land, and even other builders, while keeping both the land and leverage off their balance sheets.
For example, a developer seeking to purchase a $100 million piece of land with 40% equity might put up $19.6 million, or 49% of that equity stake, with a partner contributing $20.4 million, or 51%. The JV would fund the remaining $60 million with debt, which, because the builder's equity stake is less than 50%, would not appear on the company's books. Private-equity funds have been active participants in such deals.
Lennar used a joint venture to purchase the 3,718-acre El Toro Marine base in Irvine last year, with equity partners including MSD Capital, the investment vehicle for Michael Dell; Rockpoint Group; and Blackacre Institutional Capital, the real-estate arm of Cerberus Capital Management, a hedge fund.
Hovnanian likewise used a joint venture in 2005 to acquire the assets of Town & Country Homes, a Lombard, Ill., home builder. Its equity partner: Blackstone Real Estate Advisors. Hovnanian's total investment in unconsolidated joint ventures was $217 million at the end of the July quarter, about 11% of its book value.
So far, none of the nation's top 13 home builders, save Lennar, appears to have written off equity in joint ventures. On the other hand, earnings from joint ventures have declined at some companies. Beazer's share of income from joint ventures declined to $127,000 in the June quarter, from $2.95 million a year earlier.
Some home builders guarantee the debt of their joint ventures, which could come back to bite them if market conditions worsen. Lennar, for example, guarantees $1.2 billion of debt for its JVs and enters into option contracts to buy land from them. When the builder is also the guarantor, industry insiders say, a joint venture tends to get more favorable terms from lenders. But if things unravel, the company could wind up with a lot more debt than it discloses on its balance sheet.
In a worst case, or one close to it, the home builder might opt to prop up a joint venture with additional equity financing. If its interest exceeds 50%, under accounting rules it would have to consolidate the JV, with all its liabilities, into its own operations.
Every real-estate cycle is different, and it's too soon to tell whether this one will end with a whimper or a bang -- one that rivals, and maybe exceeds, the Nasdaq's collapse in 2000. Land options and off-balance-sheet joint ventures are designed to mitigate corporate risk in the event of calamity. If market conditions worsen, however, they might provoke it.
家园 多谢！！！
家园 几个月前作过点功课,正经地乱说几句 google不是一般炒作感念的公司。如果不是形势所逼的话，Page那两个stanfurd怪胎大概还不肯上市。古狗的财政状况和基本因素是不用忧虑的。
股票定价除了市盈率以外，还有一个很有决定性的因素，就是增长率。当年网络泡沫的一个支持论点就是网络公司的增长率高。高到可以支持这些几十几百倍于账面的价格。这也是当年网络公司疯狂赔钱也要增加业务的基本原因。亚马逊曾经每卖一本书要赔1美元，今天，它是世界上最大的书商，市值135亿美元（本日价格）。不过十年前，这可是一家在portland的小公司，只有20多个员工加一个大仓库而已。
现在古狗的高市盈率，无非也是在体现市场对它的高增长率的预期。
金融上的abnormal earning valuation 可以从数学上解释这种定价方法。
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/weaver/BV%20&%20Litigation%20Support%20Articles/articles/valuation_based_on_discounted_ab.htm
希望有帮助。