主题：最近在看本抗日的书。 -- johny

看到南京保卫战和大屠杀，很郁闷。

唐生智当初信誓旦旦要和南京共存亡，但12日他就坐上预先准备的汽艇开溜了。这斯还把其他的渡船大都烧掉了，人说当婊子就不要立牌妨了，这斯倒好，自己当婊子，拿守城官兵的性命来立牌妨，操！

12日虽然城外官兵败了，但退进南京城里还是井然有序，军队失去约束，争先逃跑，以致发生挹江门自相残杀的事情都是在得知最高司令逃跑之后。

中国的事情从来都是这样，近代以后大将阵前逃跑引起全军崩溃自甲午平壤之战叶志超始一再发生，武将不惜死就那么难以做到吗？

还是岳武穆说的好，只要能做到“文官不爱钱，武将不惜死”，中国的事情就大有可为。

痛心！

唐生智的问题不是怕死不怕死，而是没有预先安排好应变部署，对部队没有有效的指挥，这种情况下，就算唐生智学赵括冲阵自尽，也无法改变战局。作一方统帅，其实就是千万弟兄把性命交给你，唐生智应该上军事法庭的。

http://www.cchere.com/article/24172

原来准备宣布为不设防城市，但老唐拍胸脯，最后又装孙子……

守南京的部队其实在淞沪会战中死伤惨重，更本不堪一战，很多都是补充的新兵，战斗力下降很厉害。

不过我想强调的是失败固然是不可避免，但作为最高战地指挥，战前先断了大家的后路(可没忘记给自己留下一条船)，战中置千万将士生命于不顾，拔脚就溜，实在是令人不齿。

失败不可怕，可怕的是无秩序的溃败，唐生智守南京不算错，守不住也不怪他，但本来可以有秩序地撤退搞成这个样子，实在是他的责任。

作为军人，他的武德实在是太差了！

最近看的那本书上说日军的追击并不坚决，他们在攻占上海，打破苏福防御线(还是苏州河？记不太清了)后停留耽搁了大约一个月左右，12月初大本营才下达攻击南京的命令，之前日本内阁向南京提出媾和的条件，有德国大使居间往来奔走，据说蒋于12月2日想屈服，准备接受媾和条件，但前一天，日本大本营等不及，已经下了攻击令。

从11月初到12月初，中国从上海方面撤下来的军队本来是可以充分准备撤退或防御的。都被蒋这个笨蛋搞成一团糟。

原来也知道南京无法守，但老唐可能是大烟抽太多了，在会议上抬出了总理灵寝所在的大高帽，让老蒋咽不下，又心怀可以一战的侥幸。

其实确如兄所说，如果老唐最后不装孙子，南京一战也不会这样惨，至少士气不会因统帅逃跑而崩溃，这样多的人被俘虏。

中日议和是德国大使陶得曼做的中人，彼此试探而已，双方底线差太远，从来就不可能成功。

认为首都不放一枪就撤，不能向国人交待。李宗仁回忆录中提到过这一段。

这和后来阎老西让傅作义死守三天太原的性质相同。

后来投了共产党当高级卧底，所以本朝对唐的评价还不算差。

实际上南京保卫战，第一该杀的人就是这个唐生智。

他比老韩的罪孽还大，十万人被俘虏啊，他做为统帅居然仍下军队率先逃跑，而且根本不留任何有组织撤退的方案。

唐生智真是给湖南人丢脸。

又没有什么国际组织监督烧船，何必要真烧呢？再说即使日本人决定不打南京了那些船只也可以变卖充老唐的军费啊！~凡事何必做的这么绝呢？船烧了也罢，还给自己留条船专门逃跑，国难当头不能与首都阵地共存亡，一点军人的气概都没有，确实该杀

The road to Nanjing and to the Generalissimo himself lay open. For Matsui, now Commander-in-Chief of Japan's newly created Central China Expeditionary Force, the temptation to push on was irresistable - but the order to advance did not come. On 3 November, a peace initiative sponsored by Vice-Chief of Staff Hayao Tada had begun through the medium of the German Ambassordors to Tokyo and Nanking. The terms of peace, including the creation of a demilitarized zone extending south of Yunting River and a Nationalist-Japanese partnership against Communists, were not actually presented to Chiang until 5 November. Time was needed to consider and negotiate the terms - but time was running out now for Tada and the others crying restraint, who found themselves locked in a battle as fierce as that raging on the Yangtse with those who wanted to expand the war against China.

The debate over whether or not to advance to Nanking laid bare a fundamental flaw which had developed in the character of the army since the 19th century. From being simply the executant of policy decided largely by others, the army, through dedicating itself to preparing Japan for total war, had come to take a profound interest in formulating as well as executing policy. But the new interest was not supported by a new system or institutional framework. The army might now be capable intellectually of deciding its own destiny; but organisationally it was still the servant of others.

Under men like Nagata and Araki, organisational frailties were concealed to some extent, such was their personal dynamism. The one an effective consensus builder, the other the head of a powerful clique, both were clear in their minds as to what needed to be done, and under their direction the Imperial Army could make policy purposefully and relatively efficiently. In their different ways they acted as clearing houses for the masses of conflicting opinions rising from every section of the General Staff and Army Ministry and the independent commands on the mainland - assembling, focussing, filtering, integrating, analysing, interpreting. Had either Nagata or Araki been Army Minister when the shots were fired at the Marco Polo Bridge, it is quite possible that war would never have developed.

Without this kind of dominant figure, policy-making in the army was haphazard in the extreme, determined on the one hand by temporary coalitions of officers in the Tokyo High Command and on the other by the pre-emptive action of officers in the field. General Yanagawa, for example, used his field command to try and enforce his view of policy by ordering the 10th Army to advance on Nanking. This was immediately countermanded by Tada, who repeated his prohibition to Matsui. Neither General disobeyed this direct order, but a cabal of officers in Tokyo who wanted Nanking captured then proceeded to work on Tada to persuade him that his order reflected bad policy.

This was not conspiracy or insubordination; there was no secret about the identity of these expansionist officers. They were sincere in their views - and in the Imperial Army, sincerity was always allowed a voice. As it happened, events on the mainland played into their hands. The landings at Hanchow Bay and Plover Point had been very successful, successful enough to encourage those who wanted to advance - but not to convince Chiang that defeat was inevitable. During November the peace initiative gradually withered. On 1 December, Tada capitulated and gave the order to move on Nanking; on 2 December, Chiang also gave in and agreed to discuss peace - 24 hours too late to save his capital.

The Nanking decision illustrated not only the method of policy-making, but its sinister weaknesses. So wide was the spread of the consensus required for action that no one person had a sense of responsibility for what eventually happened, though later an individual might accept personal credit or blame. In effect, it was a 'system of irresponsibilities', lacking accountability and potentially irrational. And because they were taken jointly, desicions tended to reflect the general characteristics of the group. As all the members had been through the same process of indoctrination at Ichigaya, stressing the importance of the attack, the consensual system tended to ensure that anmy policy was weighted towards action.

The method was also very slow. In the case of Nanking, it had taken nearly a month to make the desicion in favor of a campaign that was to last only 12 days - militarily, a disastrous delay. A swift pursuit might have broken the back of Chiang's military strength for good; instead the commanders' vacillation allowed many of Chiang's troops to escape.

早在抗战开始之后，唐就和蒋百里谈过抗战的方针，比较一致的看法就是拖死日本人，唐生智本人患有严重的胃病，还是坚持在第一线，作为军人来说，他比那些一枪不放望日兴叹的人要强，因为中日对决，不战则亡，没有第二条道路可供投机。

唐生智守南京之后发出烧船的命令

（临时有事，回头再写好了，不好意思）

老蒋也没逼着老唐出来打这一仗，他吃饱了撑得自己跳出来啊？既然出了山就好好干，怎么关键时刻又掉链子了？

温相快点写，等着解惑。