西西河

主题:【原创】土共啥时候下台? -- suwater

共:💬208 🌺1357 🌵42 新:
全看树展主题 · 分页
/ 14
上页
家园 你怎么能那么确定林黛玉就不会化个妆,变成薛宝钗呢?

改开30年,tg已经不是以前的那个了。

如果实现了上面的三条,谁知道会变成干什么样子的?

而且最后一条,文官监督,为什么不是人民监督呢?不是民选吗?

家园 你是不是想“干吗有钱不花在给自己买校车上”?

很抱歉,政府的财政预算有个分配问题。这个东西不是您自己家的账户,不买新电视去上补习班,说一下就好了。

如果我查的资料没错的话,政府的财政预算是每年分到各个部委手上的,对外援助和投资拿钱的是商务部的事情,花的是他们的钱。至于国内校车的问题,那是由民政部还是教育部管不好说,无论怎样,商务部的钱也不会拿到国内来用,专款专用的。

家园 补充材料来了,那些校车是一份大合同的赠品好吗?

  附宇通网站的新闻:

  2010-10-25

   据悉,宇通公司在4月14日,与马其顿交通部在斯科普里签署生产202辆双层公交车协议,成为宇通公司乃至中国客车进入欧州市场竞标成功的最大销售订单。这批订单同样也是马其顿历史上最大的一批政府投资。此次样车顺利通过验收,标志着该项目正式进入批量生产阶段。

  http://www.yutong.com/news/yutongnews/10/15864.shtml

  

   9月6日,马其顿首都斯科普里市的鲍里斯特拉依科夫斯基体育馆热闹非凡。盛大的宇通公交车交接仪式给当天的马其顿共和国成立20周年再添喜事。马其顿总理格鲁埃夫斯基、国家财政部长和交通部长等政府高级官员悉数到场,中国驻马大使、政务参赞等也应邀出席。

  http://www.yutong.com/news/yutongnews/09/29598.shtml

  

  202台宇通客车的中标金额

   中国客车英文网[www.chinabuses.org]: 马其顿媒体近日报道,中国郑州宇通集团被制定为马首都斯科普里制造202台双层公交大巴的供货商。

   据报道,郑州宇通集团将在2013年之前向斯科普里提供【合同价值约3200万欧元的202台双层大巴】。新的巴士将按照斯科普里现在运行的公交车外形制造,这些现存的公交车从上世纪50年代就开始使用了。新巴士的使用将为斯科普里的公共运输缓解压力并为城市增加一道亮丽的风景。

  http://www.chinabuses.com/overseas/2010/0421/article_3874.html

说白了就是宇通集团签下了一份202辆公交车的大单,这些校车是赠品。还有些别的经贸往来和援助,都可以说是为了合同和生意。

 国内公开报价80万一辆(实际成交价应该更低),马其顿的中标价欧元折算人民币约133万一辆。3200万欧元的大合同,20多辆校车小意思的。买个高档笔记本就送移动硬盘一个,很正常吧。 

你明白了没有?

家园 不用那么久了

但现在当了艾胖子债主,还是银行转账的估计看不到了。

家园 这件事本来很简单

一个是安全事故,是政府财政预算的问题。另一个是纯粹的生意。本来没什么关系。

但这件事说明了一点:外交部的老爷们实在没脑子!!!

作为一个职业是忽悠外国人,对外搞宣传的部门,老爷们要么不关心时政,要么就是没有政治敏感度。不管是哪种情况,都该打屁股!

家园 你把这些人想得好了

其实我颇怀疑他们已经不只是尸位素餐,恐怕是在里应外合。

再加上这一年网络气氛很有点疯狂,什么玩意儿都出来了

甚至lz发的这贴,我都觉得很可疑——以前还问问有没人上街,现在连这个都不提直接问啥时下台,想得挺美啊

如此种种,感觉就是各种迫不及待

现在就看到的,宣传口恐怕是已经全面陷落了。不知道在我们面前的,是黎明前的黑暗呢,还是漫漫长夜的开始。

家园 中国是一块神奇的土地
家园 看看香蕉人拜访瓜父和换鸟,你就没想到另外的可能性?

不过WSJ最近的报道,看到米的副大统领用孙女勾引开红色法拉利穿着tuxedo的瓜。你说的其中一种可能性会变味地。

看看吧:

Children of the Revolution

China's 'princelings,' the offspring of the communist party elite, are embracing the trappings of wealth and privilege—raising uncomfortable questions for their elders.

外链出处

One evening early this year, a red Ferrari pulled up at the U.S. ambassador's residence in Beijing, and the son of one of China's top leaders stepped out, dressed in a tuxedo.

Enlarge Image

PARTYKIDS

PARTYKIDS

Getty Images

Bo Xilai, with his son, at a memorial ceremony held for his father in Beijing, in 2007.

Grandfather, Bo Yibo — Helped lead Mao's forces to victory, only to be purged in the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. Subsequently rehabilitated.

Son, Bo Guagua — Graduate student at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

Father, Bo Xilai — Party secretary of Chongqing and Politburo member, likely to rise to the Politburo standing committee in 2012.

Bo Guagua, 23, was expected. He had a dinner appointment with a daughter of the then-ambassador, Jon Huntsman.

The car, though, was a surprise. The driver's father, Bo Xilai, was in the midst of a controversial campaign to revive the spirit of Mao Zedong through mass renditions of old revolutionary anthems, known as "red singing." He had ordered students and officials to work stints on farms to reconnect with the countryside. His son, meanwhile, was driving a car worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and as red as the Chinese flag, in a country where the average household income last year was about $3,300.

The episode, related by several people familiar with it, is symptomatic of a challenge facing the Chinese Communist Party as it tries to maintain its legitimacy in an increasingly diverse, well-informed and demanding society. The offspring of party leaders, often called "princelings," are becoming more conspicuous, through both their expanding business interests and their evident appetite for luxury, at a time when public anger is rising over reports of official corruption and abuse of power.

A Family Affair

A look at China's leaders, past and present, and their offspring, often known as 'princelings.'

View Interactive

State-controlled media portray China's leaders as living by the austere Communist values they publicly espouse. But as scions of the political aristocracy carve out lucrative roles in business and embrace the trappings of wealth, their increasingly high profile is raising uncomfortable questions for a party that justifies its monopoly on power by pointing to its origins as a movement of workers and peasants.

Their visibility has particular resonance as the country approaches a once-a-decade leadership change next year, when several older princelings are expected to take the Communist Party's top positions. That prospect has led some in Chinese business and political circles to wonder whether the party will be dominated for the next decade by a group of elite families who already control large chunks of the world's second-biggest economy and wield considerable influence in the military.

Related Video

Pink Diamonds Find New Best Friend: China's Rich (11/18/2011)

China's Pork Problem (11/01/2011)

Niall Ferguson: China Masters the 'Killer Apps' (11/03/2011)

The Complexities of Doing Business in China (11/23/2011)

"There's no ambiguity—the trend has become so clear," said Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese elite politics at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "Princelings were never popular, but now they've become so politically powerful, there's some serious concern about the legitimacy of the 'Red Nobility.' The Chinese public is particularly resentful about the princelings' control of both political power and economic wealth."

The current leadership includes some princelings, but they are counterbalanced by a rival nonhereditary group that includes President Hu Jintao, also the party chief, and Premier Wen Jiabao. Mr. Hu's successor, however, is expected to be Xi Jinping, the current vice president, who is the son of a revolutionary hero and would be the first princeling to take the country's top jobs. Many experts on Chinese politics believe that he has forged an informal alliance with several other princelings who are candidates for promotion.

Among them is the senior Mr. Bo, who is also the son of a revolutionary leader. He often speaks of his close ties to the Xi family, according to two people who regularly meet him. Mr. Xi's daughter is currently an undergraduate at Harvard, where Mr. Bo's son is a graduate student at the Kennedy School of Government.

“Princelings were never popular, but now ... there's some serious concern about the legitimacy of the "Red Nobility." ”

Already in the 25-member Politburo, Bo Xilai is a front-runner for promotion to its top decision-making body, the Standing Committee. He didn't respond to a request for comment through his office, and his son didn't respond to requests via email and friends.

The antics of some officials' children have become a hot topic on the Internet in China, especially among users of Twitter-like micro-blogs, which are harder for Web censors to monitor and block because they move so fast. In September, Internet users revealed that the 15-year-old son of a general was one of two young men who crashed a BMW into another car in Beijing and then beat up its occupants, warning onlookers not to call police.

An uproar ensued, and the general's son has now been sent to a police correctional facility for a year, state media report.

Top Chinese leaders aren't supposed to have either inherited wealth or business careers to supplement their modest salaries, thought to be around 140,000 yuan ($22,000) a year for a minister. Their relatives are allowed to conduct business as long as they don't profit from their political connections. In practice, the origins of the families' riches are often impossible to trace.

Last year, Chinese learned via the Internet that the son of a former vice president of the country—and the grandson of a former Red Army commander—had purchased a $32.4 million harbor-front mansion in Australia. He applied for a permit to tear down the century-old mansion and to build a new villa, featuring two swimming pools connected by a waterfall. (See the article below.)

Enlarge Image

PARTKIDS2

PARTKIDS2

Corbis

BO XILAI waves a Chinese flag during a concert with revolutionary songs in Chongqing on June 29.

Many princelings engage in legitimate business, but there is a widespread perception in China that they have an unfair advantage in an economic system that, despite the country's embrace of capitalism, is still dominated by the state and allows no meaningful public scrutiny of decision making.

The state owns all urban land and strategic industries, as well as banks, which dole out loans overwhelmingly to state-run companies. The big spoils thus go to political insiders who can leverage personal connections and family prestige to secure resources, and then mobilize the same networks to protect them.

The People's Daily, the party mouthpiece, acknowledged the issue last year, with a poll showing that 91% of respondents believed all rich families in China had political backgrounds. A former Chinese auditor general, Li Jinhua, wrote in an online forum that the wealth of officials' family members "is what the public is most dissatisfied about."

One princeling disputes the notion that she and her peers benefit from their "red" backgrounds. "Being from a famous government family doesn't get me cheaper rent or special bank financing or any government contracts," Ye Mingzi, a 32-year-old fashion designer and granddaughter of a Red Army founder, said in an email. "In reality," she said, "the children of major government families get very high scrutiny. Most are very careful to avoid even the appearance of improper favoritism."

For the first few decades after Mao's 1949 revolution, the children of Communist chieftains were largely out of sight, growing up in walled compounds and attending elite schools such as the Beijing No. 4 Boys' High School, where the elder Mr. Bo and several other current leaders studied.

In the 1980s and '90s, many princelings went abroad for postgraduate studies, then often joined Chinese state companies, government bodies or foreign investment banks. But they mostly maintained a very low profile.

Now, families of China's leaders send their offspring overseas ever younger, often to top private schools in the U.S., Britain and Switzerland, to make sure they can later enter the best Western universities. Princelings in their 20s, 30s and 40s increasingly take prominent positions in commerce, especially in private equity, which allows them to maximize their profits and also brings them into regular contact with the Chinese and international business elite.

Enlarge Image

PARTKIDSjump

PARTKIDSjump

Landov

In 2008, Bo Guagua invited Jackie Chan to lecture at Oxford—and sang with him on stage at one point.

Younger princelings are often seen among the models, actors and sports stars who gather at a strip of nightclubs by the Workers' Stadium in Beijing to show off Ferraris, Lamborghinis and Maseratis. Others have been spotted talking business over cigars and vintage Chinese liquor in exclusive venues such as the Maotai Club, in a historic house near the Forbidden City.

On a recent afternoon at a new polo club on Beijing's outskirts, opened by a grandson of a former vice premier, Argentine players on imported ponies put on an exhibition match for prospective members.

"We're bringing polo to the public. Well, not exactly the public," said one staff member. "That man over there is the son of an army general. That one's grandfather was mayor of Beijing."

Princelings also are becoming increasingly visible abroad. Ms. Ye, the fashion designer, was featured in a recent edition of Vogue magazine alongside Wan Baobao, a jewelry designer who is the granddaughter of a former vice premier.

But it is Bo Guagua who stands out among the younger princelings. No other child of a serving Politburo member has ever had such a high profile, both at home and abroad.

His family's status dates back to Bo Yibo, who helped lead Mao's forces to victory, only to be purged in the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. Bo Yibo was eventually rehabilitated, and his son, Bo Xilai, was a rising star in the party by 1987, when Bo Guagua was born.

The boy grew up in a rarefied environment—closeted in guarded compounds, ferried around in chauffeur-driven cars, schooled partly by tutors and partly at the prestigious Jingshan school in Beijing, according to friends.

In 2000, his father, by then mayor of the northeastern city of Dalian, sent his 12-year-old son to a British prep school called Papplewick, which according to its website currently charges 22,425 (about $35,000) a year.

About a year later, the boy became the first person from mainland China to attend Harrow, one of Britain's most exclusive private schools, which according to its website currently charges 30,930 annually.

In 2006, by which time his father was China's commerce minister, Mr. Bo went to Oxford University to study philosophy, politics and economics. The current cost of that is about 26,000 a year. His current studies at Harvard's Kennedy School cost about $70,000 a year.

“'The children of major government families get very high scrutiny,' says the granddaughter of a Red Army founder.”

A question raised by this prestigious overseas education, worth a total of almost $600,000 at today's prices, is how it was paid for. Friends said that they didn't know, though one suggested that Mr. Bo's mother paid with the earnings of her legal career. Her law firm declined to comment.

Bo Guagua has been quoted in the Chinese media as saying that he won full scholarships from age 16 onward. Harrow, Oxford and the Kennedy School said that they couldn't comment on an individual student.

The cost of education is a particularly hot topic among members of China's middle class, many of whom are unhappy with the quality of schooling in China. But only the relatively rich can send their children abroad to study.

For others, it is Bo Guagua's freewheeling lifestyle that is controversial. Photos of him at Oxford social events—in one case bare-chested, other times in a tuxedo or fancy dress—have been widely circulated online.

In 2008, Mr. Bo helped to organize something called the Silk Road Ball, which included a performance by martial-arts monks from China's Shaolin temple, according to friends. He also invited Jackie Chan, the Chinese kung fu movie star, to lecture at Oxford, singing with him on stage at one point.

The following year, Mr. Bo was honored in London by a group called the British Chinese Youth Federation as one of "Ten Outstanding Young Chinese Persons." He was also an adviser to Oxford Emerging Markets, a firm set up by Oxford undergraduates to explore "investment and career prospects in emerging markets," according to its website.

This year, photos circulated online of Mr. Bo on a holiday in Tibet with another princeling, Chen Xiaodan, a young woman whose father heads the China Development Bank and whose grandfather was a renowned revolutionary. The result was a flurry of gossip, as well as criticism on the Internet of the two for evidently traveling with a police escort. Ms. Chen didn't respond to requests for comment via email and Facebook.

More

A Home Fit for a Princeling : A $32.4 million harborside mansion in Sydney

Asked about his son's apparent romance at a news conference during this year's parliament meeting, Bo Xilai replied, enigmatically, "I think the business of the third generation—aren't we talking about democracy now?"

Friends say that the younger Mr. Bo recently considered, but finally decided against, leaving Harvard to work on an Internet start-up called guagua.com. The domain is registered to an address in Beijing. Staff members there declined to reveal anything about the business. "It's a secret," said a young man who answered the door.

It is unclear what Mr. Bo will do after graduating and whether he will be able to maintain such a high profile if his father is promoted, according to friends. He said during a speech at Peking University in 2009 that he wanted to "serve the people" in culture and education, according to a Chinese newspaper, Southern Weekend.

He ruled out a political career but showed some of his father's charisma and contradictions in answering students' questions, according to the newspaper. Asked about the pictures of him partying at Oxford, he quoted Chairman Mao as saying "you should have a serious side and a lively side," and went on to discuss what it meant to be one of China's new nobility.

"Things like driving a sports car, I know British aristocrats are not that arrogant," he said. "Real aristocrats absolutely don't do that, but are relatively low-key."

—Dinny McMahon contributed to this article.

家园 别的不知道到,本地上街很清楚,没那么可怕

近8年吧,主要群体在哪儿?首要的是东北老工业集体改革,多年占40%以上(总体,不是群体上街的,主要原因是98-03破产、改制),然后是工商、教师队伍改革、事业单位试点改革(改革阵痛),然后是某工程征地(这可困扰本地n年了,涉及超广,去年开始本地主官变换,亲自到村里去了,有方案,确定拿钱,工作方法就是老tg的成立工作组深入农村调查,最惨的村把土地台帐少了,地在水下,重新一点点儿丈量的,根据村民口述核对,然后重点解决今后出路——集体发展,附带对困难群众的单独救助,有点儿难以想象对不),然后是退伍军人(政策问题,选工作选前?然后过一年给工作给钱,现在缓和了,因为钱在上),然后单个群体人不多但总人数多、涉及情况及其复杂的集体企业改制(烂事一堆,解决难度大,现在还处ing状态,需要逐个解决),还有天下奇葩的多起非法集资案(超级坑爹,现在还在收尾)

个人认为破坏性最强烈的,是突发性的出租车司机、只组织几次(组织及其周密,有对讲机联系,比带路党可怕多了,当时罢运时自组督查队,对单独上街的砸车,超恶,一点儿不同情,他们利润原来就高(白班110+夜班80,以前价格),至少比我工资高,现在更不得了,但zf有问题被他们抓到了,结果现在全市消费者买单,拼车、拒载频发),另有出租车改制也引发n多问题,现在也在ing。

为什么不说征地,因为近年征地补偿标准提升了,征一次发一次,我是羡慕嫉妒恨啊,一般都是百万级的,注意人家是办社保后,不怕赌钱输光了。但03-06年初部分跟现在比差远了,当时标准确实都不高,可是本地当时工资也不高,但确实政策变动,个人表示理解。现在征地、征收(集体土地或国有土地上合法、不合法房屋)、拆迁不多了,还是标准提升了,去年不说,今年棚改差不多的都能多得点儿,有的几十米房屋因为人口多换了n套,N大于等于3,本来政策有规定应该是1套+n套廉租房,但和谐为主,给法院不如卖人情给老百姓,so征收办(拆迁办)的也不傻,反正报上去领导批,差不多的领导也怕担责任,能用钱解决的都不是问题。还有好多不属于棚改的也被棚改了,不具体说了,本地boss新神经吗,不怕不赚钱,虽然外地群众不理解,但boss手下好干啊。

如果说单体或较少人数的,征地、拆迁有,但很多背后有问题,不多说,前几年,本地一项大规模拆迁,纪检委牵头公安局、住房局、建委等成立工作组专门审证照,报纸一批批的公示作废,n多房产当时没人敢要补偿,因为本地大boss发话,查实就下岗。这批人现在闹得凶!!

个人还是认为,或许很多领域都会放宽,因为以后有些措施会更给力更严,所以动嘴没人管,动手可不容易了。

家园 等着各级boss真抛头颅,恐怕没有那份心了,身娇肉贵。

指望他们没戏。民逗什么的也一样,读书人造反,哼哼,那是没见过暴力手段,现在可不是20年前了,经验丰富多了。

这么大一个系统,为了政绩也罢、演戏也罢,肯定是系统越来越完善,个人看到本地好几项政策漏洞被堵死,原来故意或非故意留的。还有,希望从政策到法律尽快都堵死,别说什么实践届有难度,这些人为漏洞才可怕。

个人盼着尽快行政行为、法院审判行为责任终身制,每一项都像改革前把人名写上,终生计入档案,这次不允许把档案修改和销毁,出问题就查,还有人事推荐也是。

腐败,等征信体系建立起来了,国内不用公示就一目了然了,剩下的就看上边怎么办了。有银行的朋友应该知道,反洗钱为由对账户一定额度操作(存、取、汇)的统计。

家园 就算TG会下台,也许只是一次蜕变,而且现在就已经开始了

反正我确信一点,只要TG在原则上始终高举毛泽东思想的红旗,想下台是不可能的。

虽然也知道共产主义虚无缥缈,但至少,TG的国家资本主义道路正在为那乌托邦一般的理想构筑地基。

家园 这么坦白,党国颜面何在啊?啊,已经不要了?没有了?
家园 说的对,不过没法子这么淡定

想象一下中国到时候的鸡飞狗跳。咳。。。。

全看树展主题 · 分页
/ 14
上页


有趣有益,互惠互利;开阔视野,博采众长。
虚拟的网络,真实的人。天南地北客,相逢皆朋友

Copyright © cchere 西西河